GLOBAL CENTRE FOR PLURALISM | CENTRE MONDIAL DU PLURALISME

Democracy Promotion and Pluralism —Mapping Study

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to help the Global Centre for Pluralism (GCP) explore the value-added of its pluralism perspective with respect to the field of practice of democracy promotion. There is obviously some overlap between the two concepts, but there are also some important distinctions, both of which this paper helps to map out. The introductory section provides a concise overview of the concept of democracy promotion and some of the principal debates in the field, followed by a brief discussion of how the two concepts overlap and differ. The body of the paper is concerned with how the concept of democracy promotion has been implemented by some of the principal actors in the field—Canada, the European Union, the United States and the Democratic Emerging Powers or DEPs (India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey)—as well as how the GCP's pluralism approach could contribute to,

add value to or help address gaps in this practice. Based on this discussion, the concluding section explains under what conditions the GCP's pluralism perspective and the current practice of democracy promotion could be complementary.

I. INTRODUCTION

Democracy Promotion: A Quick Tour d'Horizon

Democracy promotion,[2] in essence, is a set of policies designed to accelerate the transition from authoritarian to more transparent and accountable systems of government by providing external support to pro-democratic actors, institutions and processes.[3] Subsequent to the return to democratic rule in most of Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s, these policies received a further boost with

the end of the Cold War in 1989–90 and the ensuing "third wave" of democracy that was sweeping across Eastern Europe, Africa and Asia.[4] Following the lead of the US, democracy promotion is now part of the foreign policies of many European countries, Canada and that of multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU). Aside from bilateral and multilateral donors, which this paper concentrates on, there is also a dense network of non-governmental pro-democracy organizations.[5]

After more than 25 years, democracy promotion remains controversial. This is due, in part, to the fact that democracy promoters—chiefly the US but also others—have let their economic and strategic interests interfere with the support of democratization processes elsewhere, to the point of trying to impose democracy by force.[6] As a result, democracy as such has acquired a bad name and is regarded with distrust by many. But democracy promotion is also controversial because the notion of democracy itself is. Aside from different expressions of representative democracy, say, between continental Europe and the Anglo-Saxon countries, there are many competing definitions of democracy proper. One principal controversy revolves around the distinction between liberal democracy on the one hand and other more "extensive" or "substantive" forms on the other.[7] Critics of Western-style democracy have charged that representative democracy as currently practiced doesn't allow for full and equal participation of all citizens, pointing to widespread disenchantment with the political establishment as their main evidence (in turn, the defenders of modern representative democracy point to the dangers of populism).

Some other debates in the democracy promotion field appear settled.[8] No one seriously disputes anymore that democracy cannot be "exported," that idealized "blueprints" of democratic institutions or processes need to be avoided, and that the impetus for democratization needs to come from within. Still, democracy promoters continue to struggle in making their support relevant to often very complex contexts and in reaching out to the many new actors that have sprung up in recent transition processes. Their greatest challenges are getting out of their comfort zone, continuously refining and adapting their approaches and closely monitoring "what works" and what doesn't.[9] Another even bigger challenge is the strengthening of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes the world over. China, in particular, is offering a seeming alternative to the democratic model of the West, coupled with incentives in the shape of developmental assistance, more trade or enhanced economic cooperation. This is of particular interest to the many countries whose transition to more democratic forms of rule appear stalled or are going backward.[10] The following section will explore the particular relevance of the GCP's pluralism approach in this context.

Pluralism vs. Democracy: Overlaps and Distinctions

Pluralism and democracy are often mentioned in the same breath, and indeed, there is a good deal of overlap between the two concepts. When one speaks of "pluralist Western democracies," one thinks of political systems characterized by multiple and often conflicting viewpoints that are expressed and debated freely, strong and independent media that give voice to different opinions, a multitude of civic

associations giving life to a vibrant civil society, and a diversity of political parties that compete for the support of voters in free and fair elections.

Yet, beneath the surface there are important distinctions rooted in conflicting views of the nature of democratic and pluralist societies, the exercise of political as well as social, economic and cultural rights, and the desirability and feasibility of social and political change. While the democracy promoters examined in this paper do express support for pluralism, they typically understand it as either political pluralism, within certain agreed boundaries (e.g., conservatism vs. social democracy, liberalism, etc.), or as associational pluralism (e.g., the activities of churches, sports clubs and professional associations in civil society). By contrast, more extensive notions of pluralism, including and particularly those centred on ethnic or religious diversity and associated with political mobilization or claims-making by specific groups, are generally discouraged since they are seen as a threat to democratic stability.

This restrictive view of pluralism underlies the notion of polyarchy,[11] a particular interpretation of liberal representative democracy that has been quite influential among Western democracy promoters. In essence, polyarchy denotes the existence of multiple centres of power as well as respect for some fundamental rules of the "democratic game," such as regular elections and the alternation of competing political elites in government. At the same time, polyarchy is unconcerned with the "substance" of democratic rule, including with fundamental questions such as whether democratic systems are responsive to their citizens and capable of addressing their needs. Ordinary citizens are encouraged to vote, but not to mobilize and make demands outside of clearly delimited institutional channels.

For democracy promoters, a polyarchy lens has some distinct advantages, notably that of a straightforward exit strategy, once the first free and fair elections (or the first successful change of government by democratic means) have been accomplished. Anything outsiders can hope to achieve is done at this point; what remains is for the locals to sort out. In much the same way, a polyarchy lens can be a defence against the accusation of meddling in another country's sovereign affairs: by insisting on respect for the "rules of the game"—and nothing more—adherents of polyarchy can claim that they are non-partisan and don't take sides in a country's internal struggles.[12] Therefore, it shouldn't come as a surprise when (Western) democracy promoters pack their bags soon after previously authoritarian or conflict-ridden countries have completed their transition to democratic rule, often at a point when the stability, and sometimes the very survival of the newly democratic regimes, is still anything but certain.

Yet, regular free elections, basic political rights and procedural safeguards—as important as they are—provide no guarantees for effective governance that breaks down societal divisions, reconciles diverging interests, and bridges social, economic and ethnic cleavages. As the record of Western-sponsored democracy support after the Cold War shows, young democracies that fail to address these questions frequently relapse into authoritarianism. More recently, instead of such wholesale reversals of democratic achievements, many post-transition

regimes have remained in a sort of grey zone, marked by the continued clout of authoritarian elites and the persistence of authoritarian practices—intimidation of the political opposition, threats to the media, limits on the activities of NGOs or political parties—all under a (formally) democratic framework.[13]

Consequently, there is no alternative to the slow and often difficult work of building democracy from the bottom up, which above all means building democratic societies. And while there is some evidence that political mobilization, made possible by the decline of authoritarian control combined with greater freedoms of expression under democratic rule, can indeed be damaging, especially to newly democratic regimes,[14] trying to "keep a lid" on these dynamics will at best buy some time but not resolve the underlying causes. Many of today's pre- or post-transition countries are characterized by sharp internal divisions, along the lines of class, but also ethnicity, culture and religion. Their long-term democratic stability will depend not just on reconciling competing demands and interests, but also, crucially, on designing pluralist institutional arrangements (including through language rights, self-government rights and power-sharing) that can accommodate existing diversity and give diverging groups a sense of inclusion and belonging.

Democracy promoters are still struggling to come to terms with this reality. To their credit, they are now putting greater emphasis on "good governance" and the actual performance of democratic institutions before and after elections, and provide much more assistance to civil society organizations, local governments and the media. Yet, the new dynamism and changing nature of civil society in many places around the globe, together with new limitations and restrictions imposed on its activities by authoritarian and semi-authoritarian governments, constitutes a novel challenge that democracy supporters have yet to come to terms with.[15]

In particular, the idea of a "strong and vibrant" civil society, whose members aren't activists but part of the fabric of civic associations with essentially unpolitical goals, going about their activities in ways that have little or nothing to do with issues of power, influence or participation, no longer holds up to scrutiny (if it ever has). Especially in places that experienced—or are experiencing—violent conflict (such as the Middle East and North Africa), or those that only recently transitioned to democracy from authoritarian rule, civil society can be fragmented as well as highly polarized, with civil society organizations as well as individual citizens taking sides and becoming active in ways that closely reflect underlying societal divisions. These practices can undermine political stability or strengthen social conservatism, but they can also have the opposite effect by challenging established patterns of exclusion and marginalization.

Against this background, a pluralism lens, as conceived by the Global Centre for Pluralism (GCP), can usefully inform the practice of democracy promotion as well as underlying—sometimes implicit—notions of democracy itself.[16] Clearly, the GCP's rather expansive notion of pluralism goes beyond the more restrictive one that lies at the heart of "polyarchy," but it also transcends the current practice of democracy promotion with its greater emphasis on good governance, institution-building

and civil society support. The GCP's approach rests on the assumption that democratic institutions and pluralist practice belong together and cannot be separated, and that diversity is a part of that. The regular alternation of the political elites in power—that is, the "elite pluralism" of polyarchy—is never enough; neither is "formal" democracy in the sense of the mere existence of democratic institutions, regular elections, procedural guarantees and so forth. Rather, democratic institutions need to be infused with a "pluralist ethic" that ensures the "equal participation of all citizens in the political, economic and socio-cultural life of the nation," effective mechanisms to balance sometimes competing claims resulting from individual and group rights as well as, if required, asymmetrical treatment to remove imbalances that stand in the way of greater equity for all.[17]

In addition, the GCP's conception of pluralism challenges the idea of civil society as an assortment of merely civic associations, made up of individuals without political aspirations or motives. It recognizes that civil society can be fractured and divided—for example, along the lines of class, ethnicity, creed or culture—and that it can be riven by (sometimes violent) conflict. However, the proposed remedy for the resulting fragmentation and polarization is not just an ethic of tolerance and respect for others. The GCP views diversity and difference not as a hindrance but as an asset, as something that can enrich societies and make them more successful than they would be otherwise. For this to work in practice, individual citizens and groups within society need to embrace the underlying values and principles, which at the same time need to be enshrined in the institutional and legal framework as well as

the surrounding norms and practices. This rarely happens overnight: functioning pluralist societies—such as Canada, the chief example given by the GCP, although there would be others—only emerge as the result of extended historical processes.

Importantly, the GCP's idea of pluralism is not a political program, nor is it necessarily an agenda for change, certainly not at the level of political regimes. Differently from, say, the German political foundations (which work closely with fellow political movements in their activities abroad, including when it comes to supporting democracy), the GCP doesn't endorse any particular political forces or parties. Consequently, the GCP's impartial approach to promoting pluralism may be less threatening to autocratic or transition regimes than an approach that openly takes sides. Such regimes therefore may be more inclined to tolerate activities that further pluralism in the countries under their control, including greater respect for diversity, more equitable treatment of minority groups, even some institutional changes. Pluralism support, in other words, may "fly under the radar" in ways that democracy support may not.

Taken too far, of course, such an approach could lead not to a widening of pluralist spaces within societies under authoritarian control, but to some form of accommodation with autocratic rulers, even a tacit legitimation of authoritarian rule. For instance, authoritarian rulers may grant limited freedoms or privileges to certain social groups but not others, so as to shore up their own popular support bases or fragment those of the opposition. The search for pragmatic, seemingly "unpolitical," ways of widening spaces for pluralism at the grassroots

should, therefore, never be seen as distinct from the quest to enshrine pluralist principles in political and legal institutions, to extend and consolidate the rule of law, and to broaden civic, political, economic and social rights. The two goals need to be pursued in tandem, and the GCP's conception of pluralism rightly gives equal billing to both of them.

Based on this brief conceptual overview, the following sections of this paper will take a closer look at the actual policies of some of the main democracy promoters. Aside from Canada—an obvious case given that the Canadian federal government is one of the main institutional sponsors of the GCP—the focus will be on the European Union (EU), the United States, as well as the Democratic Emerging Powers (DEPs). The latter group of states, which includes India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey, has attracted much attention in recent years, on the grounds that they might help to overcome some of the problems encountered by external democracy supporters. It will be asked how the policies of these democracy supporters differ from, as well as how they may overlap with the pluralism conception developed by the GCP. This will help to map out some ways in which a "pluralism lens" could usefully inform—and sometimes challenge—current democracy promotion policies and practices.

II. CANADA: AN OPPORTUNITY TO REBUILD

The GCP rightly points to Canada as a relatively successful pluralist society, recognizing it as a key inspiration for developing its own particular brand of pluralism, built around the six "generic building blocks" of time, design, compromise, process, inclusion and commitment.[18] While certainly not perfect—the situation of indigenous peoples in Canada, persistent socio-economic inequality, as well as instances of intolerance particularly towards more recent immigrants all give rise for concern—Canada did manage to anchor diversity, ethnic dualism and multiculturalism firmly in its national identity. In addition, a multitude of mechanisms and procedures were developed to ensure that pluralist principles and practices found their reflection in the country's institutional framework.

Given this rich tradition, one would assume that Canada's support for democracy abroad would be guided by the same pluralist values that lie at the core of its own polity, resulting in a great deal of overlap with the activities of the GCP and other like-minded actors. Yet, the picture is more complicated, particularly in recent years. Under the previous Conservative government, Canada's external democracy support not only shrank in size[19] but also dramatically changed direction. While many of the activities that were still supported— electoral assistance, institutional or civil society support, media assistance and so forth—continued programming lines established long before the Conservatives took power, it was clear that the Conservatives adopted a more hard-headed and, arguably, more ideological approach to the country's foreign affairs.

Soon after winning a majority in the 2011 federal elections, top officials in the Conservative insisted that Canada would no longer "go along" just to "get along," that it would stand by its friends

(notably Israel) and that it would punish those that violated the principles it cherished (through boycotts, sanctions, even military action).[20] In essence, this shift meant that all foreign policy instruments would now be marshalled in support not only of Canada's values, but also its interests, including commercial ones.[21] In what left little room for ambiguity, the government served notice to Canada's democracy-support community that it was expected to toe the line and subsequently proceeded to dismantle Canada's existing democracy-support infrastructure.[22] In its place, the Conservatives created just one new institution, the Office of Religious Freedom. Announced in 2011, and given an annual budget of just $5 million, it struggled for several years to become operational and almost immediately came under attack for its perceived failure to treat all religions equally, as well as for distracting from the larger challenge of promoting all democratic freedoms, not just religious ones.

Clearly, the polarization of Canada's foreign policy, together with the cuts to pro-democracy programming lines and the dismantling of the corresponding institutional and civil society infrastructure, diminished the common ground with actors espousing a more open and indeed more pluralist view of the world. But with the 2015 election of a Liberal government, these questions have become moot. Instead, it will be important to see how the government will restructure Canada's foreign affairs, and what stance it will take regarding the promotion of democracy abroad.[23] This may—or may not—result in greater overlap than before with non-governmental actors, including the GCP, and in greater opportunities for influencing government policy as well as program delivery on the ground. If

it so choses, the Canadian federal government has some key building blocks at its disposal, stemming from the country's past experiences with external democracy support.

Perhaps the most significant of these is the institutional and societal infrastructure that emerged in the course of the past two to three decades, dedicated to strengthening human rights and promoting democratic development abroad. What began with the establishment of Rights and Democracy as an arm's-length public agency in 1988, over time had led to changes within the federal bureaucracy itself, at Foreign Affairs and notably at the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), where programming lines related to human rights, democratization and good governance were strengthened and expanded, or created from scratch. In parallel, government support to relevant public agencies, such as the Parliamentary Centre or the Forum of Federations was stepped up, while funding from CIDA helped nurture a growing web of Canadian NGOs and other civil society organizations that worked with local counterparts to advance the cause of human rights and democracy in the developing world.

The new government could decide to revive this pro-democracy infrastructure and re-establish channels of communication and collaboration; this is certainly something that civil society actors should push for. At the same time, the very breadth and richness of Canada's past democracy support—championed by its institutions, public agencies and civil society—concealed a glaring lack of coordination and collaboration, which made it difficult to discern strategic directions,

pinpoint synergies or disconnects, and determine the impact of Canada's significant investments in building democracy abroad. This is something that also needs to be addressed. The 2007 report by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development,[24] itself preceded by an earlier "blueprint" for a Democracy Canada Institute[25] and followed by a panel report recommending the creation of a Canadian democracy promotion agency,[26] turned a spotlight on these issues. It called for deep reforms of the existing structures, while reconfirming the underlying broad conception of external democracy support with its emphasis also on governance and human rights.

Should the government decide to again go in this direction, this could offer important opportunities for non-governmental actors. For the GCP, this could include providing conceptual help and advice, so as to anchor respect for and promotion of diversity more firmly in Canada's future external democracy support program, at the level of both civil society and political institutions. Moreover, the GCP and others could contribute to rebuilding Canada's own democracy-support infrastructure, whether or not this would involve establishing a Canadian democracy-support agency of some sort. Obviously, the GCP could also play a role in reinvigorating corresponding civil society networks, again together with others, and deliver pro-pluralism (and thus pro-democracy) programming. Whatever concrete options might exist will depend on the policy choices of the government.

III. EUROPEAN UNION: DEMOCRACY SUPPORT BASED ON RIGHTS

Contrary to Canada, where institutional as well as civil society support for democracy went into reverse in recent years, the European Union (EU) has continued to build and reinforce the framework for its own democracy-support policies over the past two decades. Based on political guidelines and action plans that are updated at regular intervals, this framework now comprises specific programming instruments (particularly the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, EIDHR), the office of a special representative for human rights, as well as annual reports detailing the state of democracy in the world.

In July 2015, the Council of the EU reaffirmed the general orientations of its 2012 Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy. Emphasizing the universal nature of all human rights, "whether civil and political, or economic, social and cultural," this framework goes on to stress that human rights will form the cornerstone of the EU's external action "without exception."[27] Acting in an exemplary way within its own borders,[28] the EU will integrate the promotion of human rights into all areas of its external action, notably trade, investment and development policy, which will follow a human rights-based approach. Allowing for the special "circumstances" in other countries, the EU will always seek "constructive engagement" and dialogue, but will stand firm when confronted with human rights violations and use all the instruments at its disposal, "including sanctions and condemnation."[29]

The EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, associated with the Strategic Framework (and renewed and updated for 2015–19), goes on to spell out specific policy actions in more detail. Essentially, the purpose of the 2015–19 Action Plan (as well as that of the preceding 2012–14 plan) is to ensure greater coherence and complementarity of the different actions, and to assign specific responsibilities to the different EU institutions as well as its member states. Among the different mechanisms mentioned, the EIDHR, managed by the European Commission, is arguably the most important one, given that it is the principal financing instrument for the implementation of the Action Plan.[30] Equipped with a worldwide mandate, the EIDHR puts special emphasis on supporting civil society organizations (but not political parties) and local activities, acting independently from the consent of host governments. Human rights and democracy are seen as inextricably linked, but despite a somewhat stronger emphasis on democracy support in the latest action plan, support for human rights, human rights defenders and EU human rights priorities still clearly dominates.[31]

Support for pluralism is not among the EIDHR's key objectives, nor is it prominently mentioned in either the Strategic Framework or the Action Plan (the 2012 Strategic Framework doesn't mention pluralism at all, and the 2015 version does only once). When pluralism is mentioned in the 2014 EIDHR regulation or concept paper, it is mostly in the context of "political pluralism," denoting the existence of a diverse system of political parties all of which can operate freely, and, to a lesser extent, that of "media pluralism," meaning the existence and unhindered functioning of different media outlets which help to give voice to a diversity of views. Pluralism of religion or belief is mentioned once in the EIDHR concept paper; the desirability of a pluralist civil society encompassing a variety of civil society organizations is also stated once. With respect to support for diversity, this is mentioned even less frequently: only once in the 2015 Action Plan (calling for media diversity), and once in the 2014 EIDHR regulation (stressing the need to protect religious and cultural diversity).

The fact that neither pluralism nor diversity feature prominently in the EU's human rights and democracy-support policies does not mean that there would be little or no overlap with the pluralism concept as developed by the GCP. In fact, many aspects of the GCP's conception of pluralism— tolerance, respect for diversity, space for individual choices but also collective compromise and mutual obligation—are reflected in the EU's emphasis on the protection and promotion of human rights (which, because these are attributes of democratic citizenship, inevitably go along with responsibilities). Likewise, the GCP's emphasis on good governance, strong civic institutions and sound public policy-making as institutional guarantees for a "pluralist ethic" permeating political institutions as well as civil society has strong parallels in the principles underpinning the EU's support for democracy. Given the considerable geographic breadth and thematic richness of the EU's programming in support of human rights and democratization beyond its own borders, there would be ample room for finding synergies with the GCP's activities to further and strengthen pluralism in the world.

However, this might not be the best way to use the GCP's much more limited resources. Simply trying to supplement the EU's human rights and democracy programming might not add much value and, in fact, might lead to a duplication of efforts in thematic and geographic areas already well served. Given the EU's much broader coverage and greater programming depth, any additional contribution by the GCP around similar priorities might well remain invisible—it might not be needed or even wanted by the EU.

A better approach might be to help close gaps or address weaknesses in the EU's human rights and democracy support. One such weakness has been a perceived lack of focus and direction, which, at least implicitly, is acknowledged by the EU itself (hence the recurring calls for greater synergies and coordination, most recently in the 2015 Council conclusions and Action Plan).[32] To be fair, an approach that aims to integrate human rights, democracy and the rule of law into all aspects of the EU's external action—from diplomacy, trade or development cooperation to science diplomacy, climate action and a host of other fields—will always be vulnerable to this kind of critique. But external observers have not simply called for better priority setting, increased efforts to bundle efforts and maximize impact, or a greater focus on learning and applying lessons. They have offered fairly specific criticisms, arguing, for example, that "the conceptualization of democracy and the means to achieve it remain vague" and that there was "a lack of a clear understanding about how human rights, governance, civil society and socio-economic development relate to democratization."[33]

What the GCP could do is help refocus the EU's democracy support in one crucial area, that of overcoming the fragmentation and divisiveness so typical of many post-transition societies. Adding to the EU's own efforts at streamlining and better coordinating its external democracy-support portfolio, the GCP's pluralism approach could serve as an organizing principle lending greater coherence and consistency to what is sometimes a multitude of only loosely connected actions. Such an approach could benefit both the EU's efforts at furthering human rights—by putting special emphasis on the protection and promotion of religious, cultural and other forms of human diversity—as well as its attempts to further democratic statehood—by helping to instill a pluralist ethic into political institutions and to put in place the required procedural and legal guarantees.

But there are more fundamental issues to be addressed. Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci have found, based on an EU-funded study, that the EU's support for civil society activities, particularly to strengthen human rights in conflict or post-conflict contexts, has not only been "complex and bureaucratic," but it has also privileged "technical and professional NGOs at the expense of grassroots and community groups or social movements," and followed programming lines whose goals and objectives were often predetermined, with little involvement of local actors.[34] This "absence of truly participatory methods" not only created a "perception of agenda-setting from above," but also favoured the emergence of a "disembedded local civil society…lacking democratic accountability and participation from below."[35] The GCP could help the EU address such distortions in its civil society

support and to adopt a truly pluralist approach that would better respond to the increasingly diverse nature of civil society in many nations emerging from authoritarian rule. This would result not only in a more cogent and targeted set of policies but also greater relevance and impact.

Going a step further, a more deliberate approach to strengthening pluralism and diversity could also help to shore up the EU's own credentials as a global leader in the area of human rights and democracy. European societies not only have become increasingly complex themselves but also are exposed to more external shocks than before, the ongoing refugee crisis being just the latest example. Not all of them have been able to accommodate the resulting strains on their social fabric, despite the claim that Europe's linguistic, cultural and ethnic richness is one of its greatest strengths. A pluralism lens such as the one used by the GCP could contribute to highlighting the key role played by a pluralist political culture and societal ethic in holding together also more modern societies, countering the many centrifugal forces they are exposed to today.

IV. THE UNITED STATES: THE FIRST DEMOCRACY PROMOTER

Arguably, the United States invented the modern notion of democracy promotion. Originally conceived under the Reagan administration as a means to stave off revolutionary movements in the Third World (especially in Latin America following

the successful Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua), external democracy promotion became a mainstay of US foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Branching out from Latin America, first to Central and Eastern Europe, then to the Middle East and North Africa as well as other world regions, successive administrations helped to build and refine the respective policy framework, establish legal and institutional foundations, and support the emergence of a network of pro-democracy actors in US civil society.[36]

Formally based on the *Advance Democracy Act* (ADA) of 2007, the main delivery channel for official US assistance for democratization abroad remains the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Today USAID supports a wide variety of activities, which can be broadly grouped under the categories electoral support, institution-building and support for civil society. The latter category especially has become increasingly important in recent years after following a narrower focus on electoral assistance earlier on, which was subsequently broadened to include institution-building. But, like the European Union, the US has many more instruments to promote its pro-democracy agenda abroad, including diplomacy, moral suasion, economic bargaining and, of course, military intervention (that is something the EU does not use, although some of its member states have). The US also provides support to multilateral organizations supporting democracy, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems and the Community of Democracies that include some of the DEPs discussed later in the paper.

Aside from official channels, US democracy assistance is delivered also via none-state actors, the most visible one being the National Endowment for Democracy (NED).[37] Acting as an umbrella organization, NED distributes half of its budget to its four affiliated institutions: the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, the International Republican Institute, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity and the Center for International Private Enterprise. The other half is awarded as grants to a variety of smaller civil society organizations. While billing itself as a non-governmental organization, NED receives the bulk of its funding under the main budgetary allocation for USAID, and it entertains close links to the US government. As mentioned above, NED served as the model for the proposed (but never enacted) Canada Democracy Institute.

The United States' democracy assistance has evolved and today is more diverse, refined and professional than in earlier years.[38] Still, the pursuit of its strategic and economic interests has often led the US to stray from the principles and values underlying its external democracy-support policies. The country's 21st-century engagement in the Middle East is a good example. Following the disastrous attempt to impose democracy by force in Iraq, the US first supported the pro-democracy movements that emerged during the Arab Spring, only to throw its support behind the Egyptian military when it disposed of the Muslim Brotherhood and reassumed power.[39] To be fair, other democracy promoters have also watered down their democratic principles in the interest of political stability and Europe's foreign policy towards the Middle East has likewise been criticized, not to mention Canada's (if for different

reasons). Yet, US democracy promotion has been far more controversial, given that so often in the past it was linked to military interventions and forcible regime change.

Support for pluralism is an explicit and very visible part of US democracy support abroad, contrary to the pro-democracy activities of Canada and the EU, not to mention those of the DEPs to be discussed below. In large part, this is due to the way the US sees itself, as a nation where "men and women of different religions, ethnicities, and races can live together in a single commonwealth,"[40] and where pluralism and democracy are therefore inextricably linked.[41] In practice, two specific interpretations—associational pluralism and (limited) political pluralism—have been particularly influential for the way in which the US promotes democratization beyond its own borders.

Associational pluralism, the first interpretation, is based on a rather idealized view of US society going back as far as Alexis de Tocqueville, in which free citizens form voluntary associations and interest groups to promote their views, lobby public officials and generally try to maximize their benefits. Given that power and influence are widely distributed, none of these groups manage to dominate; therefore, the state assumes the role of arbiter in the interest of all. In turn, politicians compete for votes in free and fair elections, that, together with procedural guarantees, act as a bulwark against dictatorship and the abuse of state power by the few. The second interpretation, (limited) political pluralism, by contrast, points to the dangers of excessive citizen participation, especially by lower, less-educated groups in society that presumably are more prone

to supporting populism and authoritarianism. To reign in such anti-democratic tendencies, participation needs to be restricted to the political, economic and cultural elites. This form of top-down or elite pluralism was already described above as "polyarchy."

There are problems with both views, which have led to deformities in the way the US has supported democratization processes abroad. Those issues related to polyarchy were already discussed: putting limitations on the political agency of ordinary citizens may have short-term benefits with regard to political stability, but it cannot be reconciled with the fundamental requirement of any democratic polity to extend the same human and political rights to all. Rather, it has led to the propping up of undemocratic, deeply unpopular regimes, often in the name of safeguarding US strategic and economic interests.[42] Moreover, the historical record suggests that societal elites may not in fact be any more resistant to authoritarianism than ordinary folk (if European experiences with fascism or bureaucratic authoritarianism in Latin America are any indication).

Yet, associational pluralism also has its issues. At a fundamental level, it is an ideological construct that has little to do with the reality of state-society relations in most states—not least the US itself— because it obscures some very real differences in terms of power and resources (something that isn't helped by trying to export societal "blueprints" elsewhere). More damaging in practice has been a tendency to politicize programs billed as support to non-political civil society groups and to use them to push US interests (especially in post-war settings

such as Afghanistan or Iraq), while at the same time opposing civil society activism on the grounds that this would aggravate existing tensions. This greatly damaged US credibility (and that of other democracy promoters); it also restricted the role of civil society actors in contributing to negotiated agreements between opposing groups (for example, via limited autonomy, self-government or power-sharing arrangements). [43]

Despite these caveats, there might be some overlap between US democracy promotion and the GCP's own pluralism agenda. As mentioned, US democracy support can be professional and does not always have to be serving the country's other foreign policy interests. But, as in the European case, there would be little added value simply in trying to find synergies between the GCP's rather small program portfolio and the vast range of pro-democracy activities supported by the US all over the world. Instead, the GCP could engage with US democracy promoters in other ways.

For example, based on its own work to support pluralism in non-democratic settings, the GCP could help to better "ground" US democracy-promotion efforts and to further steer them away from stereotypical—and unrealistic—conceptions of US democracy at home. This might help to make US civil society support more relevant and bring it closer to local realities, characterized by high degrees of political mobilization and social fragmentation. It might also help to put some more distance between US democracy support and the country's security and economic interests, particularly in war-torn societies, and facilitate the involvement of all civil society actors in conflict mitigation and resolution

efforts. At least in principle, similar to what was suggested above with regard to the EU's democracy support, the GCP's pluralism approach could help to enrich and refocus the institutional support provided by the US, linking it more closely to the promotion of civil, political and social rights, and highlighting the importance of protecting and furthering diversity. The GCP's ability to work in places that are off limits to official US actors might also be a tempting proposition—from a US perspective—but it would quickly be compromised if the GCP were to be seen to be doing the US's bidding.

V. DEMOCRATIC EMERGING POWERS (DEPS): STILL FINDING THEIR FEET

Democracy promotion was long a preserve of Western states but this changed with the rise of the "democratic emerging powers" or DEPs.[44] Essentially comprising India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia and Turkey, these countries all experienced phenomenal economic growth in recent decades, making them key players in global trade and climate negotiations, or in financial and economic forums such as the G20. Increasingly influential in their own regions, they have been reaching out to neighbouring countries, including by setting up their own official development assistance programs.[45] But perhaps most significantly, the DEPs have become more open and democratic in the course of their economic ascent, often following long periods of authoritarianism.[46] This is their greatest difference to the emerging authoritarian powers—particularly China—whose economies and

corresponding international influence have also grown.

The specific characteristics of the DEPs (large, rising economies that have voiced leadership ambitions but are democratically constituted) have produced expectations regarding their potential role in advancing democracy elsewhere, and also in helping to overcome some of the shortcomings characteristic of Western-led efforts. For instance, given their own experience of transitioning from authoritarian rule and greater familiarity with the challenges of building democracy in Third-World conditions, DEPs democracy support might be more relevant and targeted to the needs of democratizing countries. Moreover, support might be more context-sensitive, incorporating, for example, elements of traditional decision-making or participatory democracy. If so, this would help redress the perceived "substantive" deficit of representative democracy.

So far, this innovation potential remains largely untapped. Wary of being seen as interfering in other nations' sovereign affairs, the DEPs have limited their engagement with Western-led democracy-promotion initiatives. Furthermore, not unlike their Western counterparts, they have tended to tone down their pro-democracy rhetoric to protect strategic and economic interests and to maintain good relations with neighbouring states. Still, with the exception of Turkey, the DEPs have all provided democracy support of some sort to other countries,[47] sometimes developing novel methods and approaches. The following sections provides some further detail on the pro-democracy activities of the five DEPs, as well as how these activities could

overlap with the pluralism approach developed by the GCP.

India: Doing More While Seen to Be Doing Less

Despite being the oldest democracy among the five countries examined here, India began supporting external democratization processes in earnest only after the end of the Cold War.[48] In large part, this was due to its rapprochement with the US,[49] itself prompted by realignments in regional alliance patterns and the loss of its privileged partnership with the Soviet Union. India's engagement in Afghanistan,[50] which included the construction of a new parliament building, parliamentary training of Afghan officials in India, a contribution to a project financed by the United Nations Development Programme to help establish the Afghani legislature, as well as different forms of electoral assistance, is the clearest example of this shift. Considered a "model case" by India's external affairs ministry,[51] India's engagement in Afghanistan was arguably more successful than that of Western donors, given a more hands-on approach better adapted to local needs.

Elsewhere in the South Asian region, India's pro-democracy activities were more restrained and more clearly conditioned by its strategic and economic interests. In Nepal, for example, India feared that supporting Nepal's Maoist opposition movement might encourage its own Naxalite insurgency, providing support only after King Gyanendra's defeat had become all but inevitable.[52] In Myanmar, India went a step further, abandoning its opposition to the military coup against Aung San Suu Kyi in favour of a policy of "constructive engagement"[53]

for fear that the regime might shelter rebels from its northeastern region or offer a foothold to China.

Overall, India always made sure that its support for democracy abroad would not undermine other important foreign policy objectives: shielding the country from political instability beyond its borders,[54] hemming in regional competitors such as Pakistan and countering the rise of China. A more assertive stance, building on its own experience of constructing a multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracy in a developmental context, would buttress India's democratic credentials, and give it greater moral authority in its regional and global leadership ambitions.

This is also the clearest potential overlap with the pluralism approach developed by the GCP. While the Indian experience clearly has lessons to offer others, there are equally clear shortcomings, not least the treatment of women and girls, and continuing discrimination on the basis of caste. Further extending and broadening the notion of diversity—for example, to the LGBTQ community—while ensuring that institutional guarantees are strengthened and, above all, enacted in practice, are areas where the GCP's approach and expertise could be very useful.

Brazil: A Reluctant Regional Leader

Brazil's post-authoritarian constitution contains a pledge to stand up for democracy elsewhere, but it remained dormant until 10 years after the country's transition to democracy in 1995. Subsequently, and mostly working through the Organization of American States, Brazil helped to put in place a set

of rules and mechanisms to defend democracy in the Western hemisphere.[55] But despite this regional activism, Brazil remained reluctant to interfere in what it considered the internal affairs of its neighbours, including challenges to democratic rules and procedures that stopped just short of threatening the democratic order as such. Brazil notably parted ways with the US and other Western nations in its approach to left-leaning regimes in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador.

Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil began to reach out beyond Latin America, taking the lead of the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), providing electoral assistance to lusophone countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Timor Leste,[56] and intensifying its cooperation on social policy matters with a number of African states.[57] Given that in Brazil itself, social policy innovations had helped to strengthen local institutions, reshape civil society and improve the legitimacy of the new democratic regime, this latter engagement could have offered novel opportunities for linking social policy to a broader governance and rights agenda. In the African context, however, these potential linkages were not explored, although the participation of a range of non-state actors from Brazil at least created some entry points for alternate views and forms of practice.

Brazil's insistence on not meddling in what it considers the sovereign affairs of other countries has made it more difficult for Brazil to share its own experience in building a diverse, participatory and socially inclusive polity under developmental conditions (notwithstanding remaining flaws and deficiencies). It is this diversity and inclusiveness that offers perhaps the greatest overlap with the GCP's pluralism agenda. In particular, given its own expertise of working in adverse contexts, the GCP could help Brazilian counterparts develop approaches that apply their domestic experiences elsewhere, going beyond purely technical assistance but without being seen as intruders intent on imposing their own agendas.

South Africa: From a Sense of Mission to a Sense of Drift

In the span of just two-and-a half decades, South Africa has gone from a champion of human rights and democratic principles to a country whose own democratic ethos is facing challenges.[58] Inspired by South Africa's success in overcoming the apartheid regime, Nelson Mandela's campaign to spread more democratic forms of governance to fellow African states soon ran into trouble. His démarches to isolate Nigeria's military government following the execution of activist Ken Saro-Wiwa quickly backfired,[59] and his efforts to resolve armed conflicts on the continent were equally unsuccessful. But more than anything perhaps, South Africa proved vulnerable to charges that it was doing the West's bidding, and that its trade and economic policies were perpetuating the dependency relations created under the previous apartheid regime.[60]

Keen to improve South Africa's relations with its African peers, Nelson Mandela's successor, Thabo Mbeki, toned down the rhetoric of South African exceptionalism,[61] instead emphasizing the values of African solidarity and "African renaissance." His policies, including a very lenient stance towards human rights abuses in neighbouring Zimbabwe,

were continued by Thabo Mbeki's successor, Jacob Zuma. This apparent "pragmatism" was also meant to help the ongoing expansion of South Africa's economy, so crucial in light of the country's continuing inability to bring down domestic poverty levels.

The diminishing commitment to democratic principles among South Africa's ruling elite, widespread corruption and mismanagement in the public sector, and attempts by the ruling ANC government to impose stricter controls on the media and the judiciary have all damaged South Africa's standing as the leading democracy on the African continent.[62] A particular worry is the future evolution of South Africa's political system, which has shown signs of moving away from the ideals of a "rainbow nation" and towards a form of one-party rule.[63] The xenophobic treatment of migrant workers also gives rise for concern.

These challenges at the same time constitute potential entry points for the GCP. Its pluralism approach has clear parallels with the ideal of a "rainbow nation," and its insistence to anchor respect for diversity not just in everyday social practices but also in appropriate institutional procedures and guarantees has much to offer in the South African context. Potentially, the GCP could help South Africa confront its own domestic challenges and restore its reputation as a beacon of human rights and democratic values on the African continent.

Indonesia: A Giant With Feet of Clay?

Following its own transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian rule, Indonesia's first foray into the democracy-promotion arena came with its initiative to reform the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia was the driving force behind the revision of the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and the subsequent creation of an ASEAN human rights body in 2009. But the lack of an effective sanctions mechanism and a more proactive mandate fuelled a search for alternatives. In 2008, this resulted in the Bali Democracy Forum, a unilateral Indonesian initiative to promote peace and democracy through dialogue.

A champion for democracy in its own region, Indonesia has not always played the same role internationally, refusing, for example, to condemn the human rights practices of North Korea, Iran and Myanmar.[64] The country's traditional defence of the non-interference principle, a lack of attention to foreign policy by civil society and the media, and doubts by Indonesia's rulers regarding the effectiveness of "naming and shaming" campaigns all help to explain this stance. But even in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has often tempered its critique of others, notably of Myanmar, in the hope of retaining some leverage and not creating inroads for extra-regional powers—particularly China but also India.

Domestically as well, Indonesia still faces challenges. Freedom House downgraded the country to only "partly free" in 2015,[65] largely due to a new law putting restrictions on the activities of non-governmental organizations and requiring them to support the national ideology of Pancasila (that

has an explicitly monotheist component, although the Indonesian constitution guarantees freedom of religion). There are also enduring governance deficits—particularly corruption, including within the justice system—as well as discrimination against certain religious minorities.

Again, these deficiencies provide potential entry points for a pro-pluralist agenda. Other than helping to address remaining domestic challenges, the GCP's pluralism approach could provide a basis for greater bilateral engagement with Indonesia's neighbours and potentially elsewhere.[66] Without such engagement, Indonesia's pro-democracy stance increasingly looks like a commitment to principles rather than concrete action.

Turkey: A Model Under Siege

Turkey has not developed explicit policies to support democracy elsewhere, not even under less contentious labels as the other DEPs have. Instead, the country has relied on passive demonstration and diffusion effects, benefitting from the attractiveness of the "Turkish model" of combining representative democracy and political Islam (that is itself unthinkable without Turkey's status as a candidate for membership in the EU).[67]

Turkey's "zero problems" foreign policy,[68] brought in after the Justice and Development (AKP) Party won the 2002 general elections, was an expression of this new outlook, projecting a new, simultaneously post-colonial and post-authoritarian face of the country to the region. Designed to settle all outstanding issues with its neighbours, the new policy was also meant to facilitate the further regional expansion of

Turkey's economy and to extend the reach of Turkish media and academia, which had brought Turkey's neighbours face-to-face with the effects of the country's internal transformations.[69]

This new international posture has not been free of tensions. Refusing to act as a "bridge between the East and the West," despite often-voiced calls for increased collaboration,[70] Turkey has instead emphasized historical and cultural affinities with its neighbours. Its recent regional interventions, rather than resolving "all problems," often exacerbated existing ones (namely the deterioration of Turkey's relations with Israel and Syria, and especially the renewed violent attacks on its Kurdish minority under the guise of fighting "terrorism").

A more deliberate approach to supporting democratization processes in the region (and closer coordination particularly with the EU) would help clarify Turkey's stance on these issues. Critically, Turkey also needs to make greater efforts to strengthen its own democratic polity, whose imperfections became evident in the context of the Gezi Park protests, and to tame the autocratic reflexes of its rulers.[71]

In principle, there would be ample room for collaboration with the GCP's pro-pluralism approach, although in practice such opportunities will be more limited. Turkish decision-makers have rejected any international criticism of their policies and are likely to view even constructive engagement as interference in their internal affairs. The increasing polarization of the country's domestic political scene, especially after the unsuccessful military coup in July 2016, and the

upsurge of politically motivated violence are further complicating factors. Conversely, however, the need for more tolerance and greater respect for diversity in Turkey's society, particularly with regard to its Kurdish minority, and the urgency of putting in place solid institutional and procedural guarantees are as great as ever.

VI. Conclusion

This paper has explored what value the pluralism perspective developed by the GCP might add to the external democracy support provided by some of the principal (bilateral and multilateral) actors in this field.[72] At the conceptual level, there is a good deal of overlap between the two notions, but there are also some important distinctions. Democracy promotion starts with the political sphere, targeting institutions, parties and other political actors, with the goal of making the governance systems of non-democratic countries more transparent and accountable. Pluralism in this context is mostly defined as political pluralism (the existence of different ideologies or opinion, represented above all by competing political parties and a free media) or associational pluralism, embodied in the churches, sports clubs, professional or voluntary associations in civil society.

As conceived by the GCP, pluralism takes on a different meaning, focusing above all on protecting and promoting ethnic, social, religious and other forms of diversity. Such diversity is considered a fundamental characteristic of most modern societies, but is also seen as a richness and resource that deserves to be nourished, since it leads to more adaptable, prosperous and ultimately more peaceful

societies. The GCP insists that in order to endure, pluralist principles need to be enshrined in political and other institutions, but GCP sees this more as a result of civil society processes than the other way around.

Democracy promoters (some more so than others) agree, of course, that the rights of women, children and minorities need to be protected, but they tend to see diversity chiefly as a source of political instability. Consequently, they put much less emphasis on promoting diversity and tend to discourage political mobilization and claims-making around diversity rights. Their concerns are not easily dismissed, but a refusal to acknowledge existing diversity—and divisions—within many post-authoritarian and post-conflict civil societies has its own risks, including for security and political stability. As such, the pluralism perspective developed by the GCP could usefully inform and enrich the current practice of external democracy support, in a variety of ways.

For starters, a pluralism perspective would help draw attention to the simple fact that today's societies are becoming more diverse, not just in democratizing states but also in already democratic states. It would insist that greater recognition of such diversity is important for normative reasons, and a central precondition for social and political stability. In addition, a pluralism perspective would make the point that diversity constitutes a form of social capital that ought to be promoted and harnessed for the further development of the societies concerned, including their economic prospects. Finally, a pluralism perspective would lend support to a more expansive view of how to construct

democratic political systems, which doesn't stop with regular elections, basic procedural guarantees and institution-building, but transcends the civil society support currently provided by the principal democracy promoters. Such an approach would open up opportunities to address issues relating to the "substance" of democratic rule, such as socio-economic inequality and how to counter it.

The GCP could also decide to become more involved in the mitigation and settlement of violent conflicts, whose causes are often intimately related to accommodating the grievances and perceived rights of specific societal groups, and therefore to the construction of post-conflict democratic systems. This would imply a more specific focus on issues such as language rights, self-government rights or power-sharing.

Specific entry points depend on the respective orientations and priorities of the different democracy promoters. As explained in the text, in Canada there might be opportunities to contribute to a conceptual reorientation of the country's external democracy support, its practical delivery, as well as the rebuilding of Canada's democracy-support infrastructure. In the case of the European Union, there could be opportunities in the context of the EU's civil society support that could have repercussions for the EU's own treatment of diversity. Regarding the US, the GCP could help to better ground that country's democracy support and to refocus it on the specific needs in target countries, as opposed to the US's own interests. In the Democratic Emerging Powers, the focus

could lie on amplifying and extrapolating domestic success stories, provided existing deficiencies are acknowledged and addressed.

As noted, supporting pluralism doesn't have to go hand in hand with promoting democracy. Sometimes, authoritarian regimes will tolerate or even welcome activities to protect diversity, for example, to diffuse domestic sources of conflict. Just like "embedded" forms of promoting democracy— for example, development assistance designed to improve health or educational systems—pluralism support might sometimes "fly under the radar." At the same time, if only to avoid the risk of being coopted and instrumentalized, it is important to remember that pluralism often does mean political change. Ultimately, greater pluralism, just like more democracy, is a challenge to authoritarian rulers and their tolerance will have its limits.

NOTES

[1] This article reflects the personal views and opinions of the author, for which he takes full responsibility. It does not in any way reflect the position of the European Union.

[2] Some prefer to speak of "democracy support" or "democracy assistance," or avoid mentioning the term "democracy" altogether because, historically, "promoting" democracy has sometimes meant to impose it by force. Given that the meaning of all these terms remains contested, they will be used interchangeably here, generally without any reference to the use of force. For an attempt to arrive at more precise definitions, see Peter

Burnell (2007), "Does International Democracy Promotion Work?," discussion paper (Bonn: German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik [DIE], 1–2.

3   The literature distinguishes between "political" and "developmental" (or "embedded") democracy promotion. Political democracy promotion is more deliberate, targeting institutions, political parties, the media, etc. Developmental democracy promotion, by contrast, focuses on improving basic socio-economic conditions (such as human health, education and well-being), in the hope that this will also lead to greater respect for human rights and better governance. While these two approaches are complementary and, in fact, often coexist, this study only addresses the former.

4   Samuel P. Huntington (1991), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press).

5   Including, for example, the National Endowment for Democracy in the US, the various political party foundations in Germany, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy in the UK and the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy.

6   As most recently in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, but also previously in Latin America.

7   Milja Kurki (2010), "Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion," *International Studies Review* 12 (3): 362–86.

8   Apparently, without leading to greater institutional collaboration among the main democracy promoters, such as the US and the EU. Nelli Babayan and Thomas Risse (2014), "So Close, But Yet So Far: European and American Democracy Promotion," Transworld Working Paper No. 37, July.

9   Burnell (2007), 11–12.

10   Still, it is debatable to what extent these developments represent a true increase in the power and attractiveness of authoritarian regimes, or rather, a greater appreciation of the many existing obstacles to democratization, rooted in unfavourable domestic conditions and the real power or non-democratic elites. See Peter Burnell and Oliver Schlumberger (2010), "Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes," *Contemporary Politics* 16 (1): 3. Freedom House (2015), "Freedom in the World 2015," accessed 11 August 2018, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_2015_final.pdf.

11   Robert Dahl (1956), *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

12   In principle, that is. As mentioned, Western democracy promoters—the US in particular—have been accused of just that, sometimes with good reason.

13   Thomas Carothers (2006), "The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion," *Foreign Affairs* 85 (2): 55–68; Freedom House (2015).

[14] Yet, this cannot justify the generalized distrust towards any kind of political mobilization expressed in the polyarchy perspective. See also Samuel P. Huntington (1969), *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press). Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder (1995), "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20 (1): 5–38.

[15] Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci, eds. (2011), *Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press); Richard Youngs and Kateryna Pishchikova (2013), *A More Pluralist Approach to European Democracy Support* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

[16] Global Centre for Pluralism [GCP] (2012), "Defining Pluralism," Pluralism Papers No. 1 (Ottawa: GCP).

[17] GCP (2012), 2.

[18] GCP (2012), 4.

[19] According to figures derived from the yearly Statistical Report(s) on International Assistance prepared by CIDA (CIDA 2009–13), funding for democracy-related activities declined to only $140.04 million in 2012/13 from a peak of $238.45 million in 2008/9. The yearly totals are the result of adding the respective amounts under the subcategories democratic participation and civil society, elections, legislatures and political parties, media and free flow of information, human rights, and women's equality organizations, all of which appear under the general heading government and civil society. CIDA (2009–13), Statistical Reports on International Assistance (Hull, QC: CIDA), accessed 1 March 2015, http://www.international. gc.ca/development-developpement/dev-results-resultats/reports-rapports/sria-rsai-2012-13. aspx?lang=eng. Dead link

[20] The Conservative government never put its new foreign policy orientations to the test of a major debate in Parliament, nor did it set them out in detail in a formal foreign policy review. Instead, it turned to the media, including and increasingly social media. The closest the Harper government came to airing its foreign policy orientations in public were a number of speeches by Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird and Prime Minister Stephen Harper, such as to the UN General Assembly in September 2011 and September 2013, and to the Knesset in January 2014. Pluralism is mentioned in passing only.

[21] Canada's Global Markets Action Plan promised to harness "all Government of Canada diplomatic assets to...support the pursuit of commercial success by Canadian companies and investors." It is silent on the social, environmental and, indeed, political implications this might have in partner countries. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (2013), Global Markets Action Plan (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development [DFATD]), accessed 11 August 2018, http://international.gc.ca/global-markets-marches-mondiaux/plan.aspx?lang=eng.

[22] Following the closure in 2012 of Rights and Democracy (a Canadian public agency created

by the Conservative government under Brian Mulroney with a mandate to promote human rights and democratic development), KAIROS (an inter-church development coalition), the Canadian Council for International Development (an NGO umbrella group) and the North-South Centre (a publicly funded development-research institute which has since closed) all suffered drastic cutbacks. Previously, the Canadian International Development Agency's (CIDA) Office of Democratic Governance (that had been set up by the Conservative Harper government not long before) had been reabsorbed into the agency's other services, Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada's (DFAIT) Democracy Unit folded into the department's Democracy and Francophonie division, and the Democracy Council (an inter-agency mechanism to coordinate pro-democracy policies) was allowed to wither away. See Gerald Schmitz (2013), "Canada and International Democracy Assistance: What Direction for the Harper Government's Foreign Policy?," Occasional Paper Series No. 67 (Kingston, ON: Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen's University); and Gerd Schönwälder (forthcoming 2018), "A Canadian Way to Promote Democracy Abroad? Lessons From an Abortive Experiment," in *Canada and the Challenges of International Development and Globalization*, edited by Mahmoud Masaeli and Lauchlan T. Munro (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press). is this the Canadian Council for International Cooperation? https://ccic.ca/

[23] Canada's international assistance review will give some indications.

[24] Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade [SCFAIT] (2007), *Advancing Canada's Role in International Support for Democratic Development* (Ottawa: SCFAIT).

[25] Thomas Axworthy, Les Campbell and D. Donovan (2005), *The Democracy Canada Institute: A Blueprint* (Montréal: Institute for Research on Public Policy / Institut de recherche en politiques publiques).

[26] Thomas Axworthy, Pamela Wallin, Les Campbell and Éric Duhaime (2009), *Advisory Panel Report on the Creation of a Canadian Democracy Promotion Agency* (Ottawa: Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development).

[27] European Union [EU] (2012), EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted by the Council of the European Union, 25 June, 4–5.

[28] Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union commits all member states to respecting the EU's fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Violations can lead to a temporary suspension of a country's membership rights. Before invoking Article 7, a three-stage "pre-article 7 procedure" ("rule of law mechanism") is launched that allows the European Commission to assess the situation and make recommendations to the remaining EU member states (the procedure was invoked for the first time following the latest parliamentary elections in Poland). https://europa.eu/european-union/law/treaties_en

29 EU (2012), 7.

30 The financial envelope for EIDHR in the years 2015–20 was set at €1.33 billion (not including democracy support by individual EU member states). Other mechanisms include democracy clauses inserted into all agreements between the EU and other countries, regular political dialogues, electoral observation missions and much more.

31 According to the EIDHR Multiannual Indicative Programme (2014–17), up to 50% of financial allocations will go towards support for human rights and human rights defenders, as well as other EU human rights priorities. Democracy support will receive up to 20% and electoral support up to 25%. European Union [EU] (2014), Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights Worldwide Multiannual Indicative Programme, 2014–17 (Brussels: European Commission).

32 See European Union [EU] (2015), Council Conclusions on the Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, 2015–19, adopted by the Council of the European Union, 20 July.

33 Anne Wetzel and Jan Orbie (2012), "The EU's Promotion of External Democracy: In Search of the Plot," CEPS Policy Brief No. 281, 13 September, 1.

34 Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (2011), "Redefining European Union Engagement With Conflict Society," in *Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights*, edited by Raffaele Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (Tokyo: United Nations University Press), 198ff.

35 The authors stress that these criticisms apply to other democracy promoters as well. Youngs and Pishchikova (2013) make similar observations.

36 Michael Cox, Timothy J. Lynch and Nicholas Bouchet, eds. (2013), *US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama* (London: Routledge).

37 Overall, US democracy assistance amounts to about US$2.5 billion a year. Thomas Carothers (2009), *Revitalizing US Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 4.

38 Thomas Carothers (2015), "Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose," *Journal of Democracy* 26 (1): 59–73.

39 Emiliano Alessandri, Oz Hassan and Ted Reinert (2015), "US Democracy Promotion From Bush to Obama," Euspring Working Paper No. 1 (Warwick, UK: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, University of Warwick).

40 Michael Walzer (2007), "Pluralism and Democracy," *The Atlantic*, November, accessed 11 August 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/11/pluralism-and-democracy/306321/.

41 Support for civil society development is therefore a logical extension of US democracy promotion, and, indeed, the US has been a pioneer in this

area. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers (2000), *Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

42 President Franklin D. Roosevelt is said to have quipped that Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza García "may be a son of a bitch but he's our son of a bitch."

43 Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind describe how the US-driven securitization of aid policy in Afghanistan "nurtured a 'rentier' civil society, comprised of an assortment of donor-funded NGOs…[and] also promoted a particular model of state-civil relations that prioritizes service delivery over the deliberative role of civil society." Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind (2009), "Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society After 9/11 in Afghanistan," *European Journal of Development Research* 21 (5): (718). Michael J. Koplow and Stephen A. Cook (2012), "The Turkish Paradox," *Foreign Affairs*, 27 June, accessed 28 January 2013, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/print/134997. Howell & Lind not in References, please confirm it's the correct source. *FA* is broken link.

44 Thomas Carothers et al. (2014), "Non-Western Roots of International Democracy Support," Carnegie Rising Democracies Network (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), accessed 11 August 2018, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/non_west_intl_dem_support.pdf; Gerd Schönwälder (2014), "Promoting Democracy: What Role for the

Democratic Emerging Powers?," Discussion Paper No. 2 (Bonn: German Development Institute/Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE); Ted Piccone (2016), *Five Rising Democracies and the Fate of the International Liberal Order* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press).

45 Greg Chin and Fahimul Quadir (2012), "Introduction: Rising States, Rising Donors and the Global Aid Regime," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25 (4): 493–506.

46 India is the only exception to this general rule, having been democratic since regaining its independence from Great Britain in 1949.

47 Generally avoiding this precise label and opting for less controversial ones, such as electoral assistance, institution-building and governance support.

48 S.D. Muni (2009), *India's Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension: With Special Reference to Neighbours* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

49 C. Raja Mohan (2007), "Balancing Interests and Values: India's Struggle With Democracy Promotion," *Washington Quarterly* 30 (3): 100; Jan Cartwright (2009), "India's Regional and International Support for Democracy: Rhetoric or Reality?," *Asian Survey* 49 (3): 405.

50 Shanthie Mariet D'Souza (2013), "India's Aid Policy and the Democratic Transition of Afghanistan," Promoting Democracy: What Role

for the Emerging Powers? Conference, Ottawa, 15–16 October.

51 Global Democracy Initiative, accessed 11 August 2018, http://www.gdi.nic.in.

52 Sachin Chaturvedi (2012), "India's Development Partnership: Key Policy Shifts and Institutional Evolution," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 25 (4): 569.

53 Mohan (2007), 111–12; Cartwright (2009), 413ff.

54 Pratab Bhanu Mehta (2011), "Reluctant India," *Journal of Democracy* 22 (4): 102.

55 Carlos Santiso (2003), "The Gordian Knot Brazilian Foreign Policy: Promoting Democracy While Respecting Sovereignty," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 16 (2): 400.

56 Lusophone countries are Portuguese-speaking. Oliver Stuenkel (2013), "Rising Powers and the Future of Democracy Promotion: The Case of Brazil and India," *Third World Quarterly* 34 (2): 345.

57 Adriana Erthal Abdenur and Danilo Marcondes de Souza Neto (2013), "Brazil and Democracy Promotion in Africa: An Agenda in the Making?," Promoting Democracy: What Role for the Emerging Powers? Conference, Ottawa, 15–16 October.

58 Gilbert Khadiagala and Fritz Nganje (2015), "The Evolution of South Africa's Democracy in Africa: From Idealism to Pragmatism," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* [published online 14 July] 29 (4): 1561–81.

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63 Although the political dominance of the ANC is increasingly challenged by an ascending Democratic Alliance, witness the results of the 2016 municipal elections.

64 Other DEPs have done the same, see Ted Piccone (2011), "Do New Democracies Support Democracy?," *Journal of Democracy* 22 (4): 143.

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