I. INTRODUCTION

Although many years have passed, the matrix of “friend or foe” has not disappeared. It has just been transformed, modified, but its essence remains the same. Today’s reality is connected with the past through its roots. The so-called “class struggle” was imposed by ideological and economic sanctions against social subjects: the “kulaks” [wealthy landowning peasants during the time between the emancipation of the serfs and the Stalinist era], “the well-off,” “the average” and “the faithful and the clergy.” The deliberate promotion of hostile Soviet differentiation patterns of society caused fear and rejection that led to the isolation of certain social and religious groups. During 1929–32, the Soviet policy took on ominous signs of mass repression. This repression is less known than the subsequent “Great Terror” of 1937–38. Tens of thousands of people, across all ethnic groups, ranked as “socially alien classes and estates” were the victims of this tyranny. As noted by G. Soldatova and A. Makarchuk, “During the Soviet period, the existence of xenophobia was sanctioned by official ideology.” Referencing the work of sociologist A. Malashenko, they note that “this was the root of the fundamental basis of general xenophobia with a capital letter which sanctified the rejection of any cultural, social, or spiritual component that did not comply with the Soviet standard. In the official Soviet xenophobia, specific directions emerged: a religious phobia in the form of atheism and a social phobia expressed in the Stalinist idea of worsening class struggle.” At the time, the formation of the idea of the “image of the enemy” was an integral part of ideological campaigns. Depending on the direction of the regime’s policy, entire social strata and population groups could end up as the enemy. Those who did not fight the enemy or failed to expose it in time were branded as accomplices. The image of the enemy was necessary for the regime to write off miscalculations of the state, to explain the difficulties of everyday life and to create a moral justification for itself, and to more easily deal with dissent. The goal of the totalitarian regime was to create an atmosphere of fear in society as well as to achieve unquestioning obedience and the fulfillment of its orders. The implementation of measures for a socialist reorganization of the socio-economic life of the rural population based on social and religious xenophobia had particularly severe consequences in the traditionally diverse southern region of Kyrgyzstan.
Little is known about the victims of the totalitarian regime’s xenophobic policies. They were ordinary people and the vast majority of them were illiterate. Their descendants also remained at low social levels and were not able to rehabilitate their ancestors. Restoring the origins of social and religious xenophobia, and its impact, to public memory is important. Archival materials from the period provide an opportunity to strengthen democratic capacity and to promote the ideas of an integrated society.

The chronological scope of this study is limited to the period from 1929 to 1936. The reason for choosing this timeframe is because, starting from 1929, the Soviet state began to face crises in the socio-economic sphere, which led to a radical change of policy in the countryside and caused serious changes in the 1920s and 1930s. The period being studied was marked by major changes that completely transformed the look of the Kyrgyz village. Even today when discussing the “excesses,” “errors” and arbitrary actions of the Stalinist regime and its oprichniki [members of an imperial Russian police force] against farmers and ranchers in the late 1920s and 1930s, the vast majority of researchers mainly focus on the events that took place in villages in connection with collectivization, leaving out the activities referred to in the party and Soviet documents as “domestic political campaigns.” This definition encompasses all the authorities’ activities aimed at pumping material, financial and physical resources out of the villages. The process of exclusion and elimination of social groups that were seen as “alien” to the regime was carried out in close association with these campaigns. This issue has not yet been the subject of detailed research.

During the entire period studied, the Central Asian Administration (The Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b), [translator’s note: from 1925–52, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was officially the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)], SredAzEKOSO), the party and Soviet authorities of the country gave the southern region of Kyrgyzstan special significance—Osh Okrug was identified as an important area for cultivating cotton and in the production of cereals and meat which were necessary for supplying the country’s textile industry with raw materials, and for supplying the cotton fields of Central Asia with agricultural and livestock products. Accordingly, the fight against “alien elements” and “class enemies” was closely related to the so-called “economic and political campaigns” on the implementation of harvesting plans of these agricultural commodities. The xenophobic theory about the legality of intensifying class struggle to reach socialism, which was resuscitated in 1929, was used to justify coercive measures and defend their merit.

II. XENOPHOBIA IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE SOVIET STATE

The Ideological Campaign to Build the Character of the “Enemy”

The very essence of Stalin’s thesis about the “intensification of class struggle as we move towards socialism” contained a call for social xenophobia—the expectation of trouble from those around you, the search for the enemy and the fears of those who were recognized as “foreign” in the official ideology.

The alienation of one social group as opposed to another began with attempts to divide Kyrgyzstani society into the exploiters and the exploited, and to replace communities that were based on blood relations. With the passing of each year that the Soviets gained strength, the campaign gained momentum and the activities aimed at rejecting bay-manaps (people of high social status) from the main part of the population became more stringent and thorough,
and had an ideological and political orientation. Persistent propaganda allowed the Bolsheviks to easily implement land and water reforms in southern Kyrgyzstan in 1927–28. In order to enhance the mood of supporters and neutralize the majority of the population, a central propaganda commission was created. In the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad, training courses were opened to prepare local assets for agrarian reform. The training assigned a special role to the issues of class struggle, social relations and forms of propaganda. They held mass rallies and meetings with the poor to discuss the need to eliminate exploitation by bay-manaps, and distributed the Central Land Commission’s posters, slogans and special addresses. Those who were responsible for land reform held a total of 141 assemblies. They were attended by 10,722 people. The Muslim clergy was also forced to engage in propaganda work. The 1 December 1927 issue of the newspaper Soviet Kyrgyzstan published a joint statement from prominent spiritual leaders which stated that the reform was not contrary to Islamic law and made references to the Koran. During the course of this reform, which was characterized by increasingly radical measures as the year of transition approached, 497 farms that were determined to belong to bays were liquidated in the southern region and the land plots of 3,447 households were reduced in size.

Although not everything went smoothly, the authorities managed partially to drive a wedge into the relationship between the effectively functioning and the poor (farm labourer) layers of the population in agricultural regions of southern Kyrgyzstan. They were also able to bring a marginal part of the rural population into the political arena.

The main means of achieving the objective of excluding social groups that the authorities deemed to be potential opponents became the newspapers and magazines that were published in the republic. By the end of 1928, six papers were being published in Kyrgyzstan. Two of them (newspapers Kyzyl Kyrgyzstan and Leninchil Jash) were published in the Kyrgyz language, whereas Soviet Kyrgyzstan was published in Russian. In late 1931, the inter-district newspaper Kyzyl Pakhtachi was founded in Osh. In spite of the limited edition and the illiteracy of an overwhelming majority of the rural population, periodically publishing these papers as “weapons of war of the party organization” strived to form in the minds of its readers an image of the enemy full of negative views and intended to incite the hatred of the population towards the “other,” and allowed the authorities to destroy them. “Bay-manaps have always been and will remain the enemies of farm workers. The expulsion of the rich will improve the situation of the poor Kyrgyz”, “to the growing activeness of bay-manap elements, demonstrated in their hard-core anti-Soviet agitation and in their inciting ethnic hatred, we will respond by uniting the poor and middle-class blocks around the Communist Party and the Soviets.” These were some of the calls published in Kyzyl Kyrgyzstan and Sovetskaya Kirghizia [Translator’s note: Kirghizia and Kirghiz are the former Russian words for Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz, respectively] in the days before the eviction of prominent bay-manaps from the Kyrgyz ASSR territory in early 1929.

In nomadic and semi-nomadic districts, even after more than 10 years of Soviet rule, the Soviets were not able to deprive the local population of a sense of belonging to tribal unions. Neither were they able to make significant progress in trying to divide society along class lines. Describing the political situation in the pastoral-nomadic Kyzyl-Jar District (formerly Chatkal Volost of Jalal Abad Canton), the District Department of the OGPU [Obyedinyonnoe gosudarstvennoe politicheskaye upravleniye, or the Joint State Political Directorate] noted that “... in this district the existing Soviet apparats [Communist Party administrative organizations or staff in the former Soviet Union] usually had members of one clan or another; regardless of which social stratum the person belonged, one way or another he was under the full influence of the aksakal [male elders] leader of his clan and conducted his work, fiscal, and other activities as told by this leader. In the presence of deeply rooted
family-feudal relations, there are no signs of class stratification.” The authority of the political opponents of the Bolsheviks, that is, of bay-manaps, remained unchallenged. Despite the fact that the periodic elections to local councils and their results ended as central authorities wanted them to, soon almost all government appointees came under the influence of ancestral aristocracy. The 4 February 1929 joint meeting of the CEC [Central Executive Committee] and the CPC of the KASSR [Council of People’s Commissars of the Kirghiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] considered the issue of limiting their influence during the course of the re-election campaign and made a decision about evicting 43 bay-manaps. The decision was published in all of the newspapers on 5 February along with an appeal “to the laborers, the poor, farm workers, and cattle farmers.” The text of the appeal is a classic example of the process of creating an image of the enemy out of bay-manaps. The document outlines a very elaborate deceit and cruelty of the enemy. The poor and farm labourers were promised the confiscated property of the evicted in return for supporting this initiative. Judging from the subsequent reaction of the authorities, most of the “enslaved and exploited” people did not support the eviction. During the course of the campaign, there were cases when farm labourers and poor peasants, even representatives of the Soviet agencies - chairs and members of village councils - accompanied the evicted en masse. Noting these phenomena, the CEC was forced to recommend local authorities strengthen explanatory works and make the population pay attention to the fact that “... the evictions and confiscation of property will not be conducted in the future and will not affect anyone.”

Starting from 1929, in addition to the evictions of bay-manaps, the elimination of the “... socio-political group of peasants based on the ideological and political criteria to eliminate potential and real opponents of the authorities in the countryside,” in other words kulaks, came up on the agenda. The Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) gave the party organization of the republic a definitive order “to provide assistance to the poor and turn around the campaign against the kulaks in the countryside.” This danger was grossly exaggerated in the press. In 1929, during a period of only three months, national newspapers published more than 20 articles about the inhumane nature of the imaginary enemy and its criminal plans. These articles called for the consolidation of the poor peasants and farm labourers to combat this evil.

The image of the “enemy” gradually became multifaceted and expanded to include new characters. Meanwhile, the threat posed by manaps, the social group that no longer existed, that had been permanently displaced earlier from the political and socio-economic arena, was deliberately exaggerated. It is believed that even the branched system of politico-educational institutions (Red yurts, reading rooms, clubs, etc.) and the party intelligentsia targeted their audiences to find and expose the “enemies.” The subject of “the history of class struggle” was taught...
as an independent discipline in existing secondary specialized educational institutions. There is reason to believe that these classes dealt with—along with the main specialty—being vigilant to the “enemies.”

I agree with G. Dobronozhenko’s statement that “...after the official announcement at the end of 1932 about the completion of the policy of ‘liquidating kulaks as a class’ in the 1933–34 program and policy documents, a new type of ‘class enemy’ was created in the countryside: these were those who had not disappeared, but had simply changed their ‘class person.’” In addition to the still “existing kulaks,” “new enemies” emerged who were opposed to the economic policy of the authorities. Individual farmers who did not fulfill state tasks and engaged in “speculation,” “ex-farmers” and those who were expelled from collective farms for their “harmful, subversive activities” were declared as the “new enemies” in the countryside. The authorities’ understanding of “political loyalty” also changed. In the early 1930s, it mainly meant being ready to join the collective farms, but now it meant executing state tasks and duties without complaining.

The new features of “class enemies” and their tactics in the fight against the Soviet government defined the features of the state’s social policy. Repression in villages in 1933–36 was aimed not only at eliminating farms that had officially been declared as “kulak farms,” but also at the elimination of remaining individual farmers in villages.

I have come to the conclusion that during the years being studied, the Bolsheviks’ attempts to instill xenophobia among the general population were not successful because of the excessive brutality and compulsory measures aimed at the socialist reconstruction of the national economy and the population’s way of life. The Soviet party leadership, which imposed xenophobia mainly in the form of a directive, dealt with its victims on its own. The bulk of the population sympathized with the victims. However, because of fear of reprisals, they silently watched the chaos unfold. Still, there was no social paranoia that the Bolsheviks had intended to see.

Methods of Excluding the Objects of Xenophobia: Economic, Fiscal and Repressive Sanctions

Disfranchisement

After rejecting the Civil War era’s “red terror,” during the years of the NEP [New Economic Policy] the authorities proceeded to eliminate social groups and strata which they believed to be potentially hostile though depriving them of the right to vote. With the failure of the NEP, these measures strengthened. While only 970 people throughout southern Kyrgyzstan were deprived of the right to vote during the re-election campaign for local councils in 1925–26, in the course of the re-election campaign in 1928–29, 12,569 voters out of a total of 233,302 were disenfranchised. Throughout the country, a total of 29,058 people were deprived of the right to vote during the stated year. Paragraph 15 of the instruction on the elections specified more than 26 categories of people who could be deprived of voting rights.

The language of the instruction made it possible to arbitrarily interpret many of its provisions. Village councils, 77% of which were made up of poor and agricultural labourers, could interpret the law as they saw fit and add anyone who seemed to be a “class enemy” to the list of the disenfranchised while making lists of those who should be deprived of the right to vote. In addition, local councils consisted mostly of often quite illiterate farmers and pastoralists. In 1929, the percentage of illiterate council members in the country as a whole was 44%. In some regions up to 76% (e.g., Uzgen District of Osh Okrug) of council members were illiterate. In addition, the socio-economic features of the population were determined by a fairly high proportion of those who were considered in the second half of the 1920s and 1930s to be “nonlabor.” In social terms, the composition of
southern Kyrgyzstan’s population was characterized by a relatively high proportion of wealthy suburban-rural people and a significant proportion of traders in towns and large villages. These traits were a result of the conditionality of the criteria of dividing the rural population into social classes, traditional trade and intermediary functions of some cities (e.g., Osh, Uzgen), their transshipment and trading value (from China to the neighbouring countries and vice versa), and the specifics of the implementation of the new economic policy in the south (stimulating crop areas for highly profitable technical crops such as cotton and actively trading livestock goods with neighbouring regions). The population’s activities related to these issues, and which determined the social structure, were the main reason for the high—in comparison to the countrywide figures—proportion of the “disenfranchised.” In 1928–29, a total of 4,098 people throughout the country were deprived of voting rights for resorting to mercenary labour. Of these, 1,911 were in the south. 5,420 traders were also disenfranchised. Of these, 1,966 were southerners. Finally, 1,933 religious figures were also deprived of the right to vote. Of these, 968 were from southern regions.

Arbitrary interpretation of the requirements of the official instruction allowed all dealers; intermediaries (daldalchis), who were common in southern bazaars; craftsmen, including masters of decorative and applied arts (jewelers, carpet-makers, embroiderers); artisans; and village chiefs (aksakals, Pentecostals) to be deprived of the right to vote.

As the documents show, due to a broad interpretation of the instruction on elections and because of ever strengthening anti-religious propaganda, all those who in some form had anything to do with religious beliefs and traditional medicine (tabibs) were deprived of voting rights and were the victims of subsequent political repression. In addition to the right to vote, people also lost other rights and certain social benefits. They were not taken into collective farms and could not become members of cooperatives. It was forbidden to serve them in shopping stalls. Taxes were levied on them on an individual basis at inflated rates. They were obliged to pay all sorts of fees and were involved in the implementation of public service obligations (e.g., repair of roads, irrigation networks, transporting goods, preparing forage and so on). When harvesting agricultural products, they were supposed to perform “hard tasks” which were much more tedious than what conventional farmers did. In addition, they could not take loans from the state or use social guarantees in case of loss of the ability to work. They also faced serious problems when traveling around the country and their children were not accepted in schools. They were turned into outcasts and were subjected to further repression.

Thus, over the course of the 1928–29 re-election campaign, which coincided with the adoption of drastic measures for scrapping the NEP throughout the Soviet Union, the process of excluding the most capable people from the socio-economic and political life of the countryside began with the efforts of the henchmen of the Stalin regime.

Many disenfranchised people tried to appeal the measures taken against them. For example, 1,404 people were deprived of voting rights in Jalal-Abad District. After their complaints were considered in April–May 1930, 475 people were enfranchised. However, 919 people still remained, including 237 kulaks, 57 merchants, 77 members of the clergy and five former police officers. The same pattern was observed in other districts. From 5 May to 10 July 1930, 3,432 citizens complained about unjustified disenfranchisement. Of these complaints, 1,122 were reviewed favourably (30% of the received complaints). Restoration of rights was usually accompanied by rather humiliating public rituals. For example, the priests had to publicly renounce holy orders. In order to restore their rights, some people cut ties with their family members and disowned their own past. Sometimes they outright lied to and bribed rural
officials upon whom a positive decision depended. The Osh Regional Archives have kept numerous complaints of farmers, cattle breeders, small traders, artisans and other segments of the population. The vast majority of these complaints focused not on the denial of rights, but on the accompanying discriminatory measures: having to pay individual taxes, being ordered to do “hard tasks,” the imposition of fines and collection of fees, dispossession, and the exclusion of their children from schools, etc.28

Various institutions were involved in sorting complaints and restoring voting rights: village councils, district and county executive committees, the Central Election Commission of the country, etc. There were also complaints addressed to the VTsIK [Vserossiysky Centralny Ispolnitelny Kommitet, or the All-Russian Central Executive Committee] of the USSR. Sorting complaints was time consuming and in most cases they were not fulfilled.

As the contents of archival documents show, all subsequent re-election campaigns continued to be held in the spirit of regulations by higher authorities about the future “intensification of class struggle.” They were accompanied by the search for enemies and violations of basic human rights. During the reporting and re-election campaigns of 1934, there were a total of 29,154 disenfranchised people in the country. 9,178 of them had resorted to hired labour, 2,063 had been living on unearned income, 1,536 were private traders, 970 were members of religious cults, 2,978 were former servants and police agents, and 1,719 were family members (over 18 years old) who were dependent on those who had been deprived of voting rights.29 The main victims of the “struggle” imposed by Bolshevik authorities were free professions, small businessmen, traders, artisans, religious leaders and the bearers of the traditional societal values. They were humiliated, lowered down the steps of the social ladder, imprisoned, exiled or executed. At the same time, the documents show that many disfranchised people were actually quite loyal to Soviet authorities. They believed that their fate was a result of some mistake and demanded justice. They did not have time to deal with the changes and quickly adapt to them.

An analysis of disenfranchisement as a legal norm and its implementation in practice allows us to understand the general course, direction and trends of xenophobic government policies, and the subsequent repression in southern Kyrgyzstan during the late 1920s and early 1930s. The issue at hand also eloquently characterizes the style of relations between the authorities and society: citizens had to guess what was expected of them and look for ways to demonstrate their full support for the regime. However, even these people were not fully insured against “troubles” such as false accusations or simple mistakes of zealous facilitators.

However, according to the Soviet Constitution of 1936 and the 1937 Constitution of the Kyrgyz SSR, all adult citizens of the country, with the exception of the insane and convicted criminals, had the right to vote and be elected.30

**Taxation**

Even fiscal policy had to play its role in excluding and eliminating the wealthier sectors of the rural population. This policy was significant in the dramatic events and the general transformation of society at the turn of the 1920s and 1930s.

The social structure of farms was determined by the data on objects of agricultural taxes. Tax rates until 1928 depended only on real property differences: land size, types of crops and the number of livestock on the farm. Wealthy farmers or cattleman paid more taxes than others not because they were considered to be bays-manaps or kulaks, but because they knew how to effectively manage their farms and were in fact richer than others.31 Starting from 1928, taxable earnings included income from non-agricultural activities. The rate of return on crops and livestock was established based on directives and on the basis of the household’s
Social and Religious Xenophobia as a Policy Instrument of the Soviet Union—History and Lessons Learned (1929–36): The Case of Southern Kyrgyzstan

social class. The adoption of the new “Regulations on Uniform Agricultural Taxation” in the 1928–29 fiscal year strengthened the use of class principle in taxation. The regulations introduced a new procedure for calculating taxes to be paid by individual farms which “stood out from the general mass of peasants in the local area by their profitability and the unearned nature of their income.” Taxes were levied “on all sources in accordance with their actual yield” and were therefore calculated on an individual bases. Hence the term “individual imposition.”

Individual taxation was overwhelmingly imposed on farms whose heads were deprived of voting rights in the course of the re-election campaign. At the same time, there were many cases where individual taxation was the basis for the deprivation of the right to vote even without taking into account the criteria set out in the relevant paragraph of the stated law. Individual taxation entailed an increase in all other charges (e.g., self-taxation, water charges, fees for cultural and educational needs, compulsory insurance payments, etc.) and obliged people to implement their labour and natural duties.

Another factor that contributed to the demise of wealthy households was the application of sanctions outlined in the 28 June 1929 decree of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars on the “Extension of the Rights of Local Councils with Regard to Supporting the Implementation of National Tasks and Plans” and with regard to tax debtors. In some places, various administrative methods, violence and repression became commonplace.

Despite huge efforts to increase the number of individual taxpayers to targeted levels, in 1929, only 1,977 households were identified and individually taxed in southern Kyrgyzstan. This represented approximately 1.88% of all farms in Osh Okrug. If we take into account that the average number of family members in agricultural and cattle farms (in 1929, there were a total of 105,224 households in the okrug) was 4.24 people (and the fact that wealthy families had even more members for objective reasons), we can estimate that the taxation burden during that year influenced the social and living conditions of about 10,000 citizens (calculations based on data on the areas of economic activity and the socio-economic features of farms in the region). A permit of sorts to distort tax legislation was provided in the circular of the People’s Commissariat of Finance of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (PCF of the RSFSR). In October 1929, the People’s Commissariat for Finance (PCF) of Kyrgyzstan sent an extract from the circular to remote areas. According to the circular, the amount of taxable income of 500 rubles—as recommended by the instructions on agricultural taxes as grounds for classifying households into the category of individually taxable—was too high for some places and made it impossible to levy taxes on all of the “… kulak farms which were to be taxed in this manner.” It stated that the recommended income levels in the instruction as grounds for individual taxation were only indicative. While establishing these criteria, all local features had to be taken into account. They had to apply income levels that would allow maximum individual taxation of all farms which were considered to be the wealthiest in the area. This meant that while categorizing farms as kulak, it was not necessarily to comply with the criteria established by USSR legislation. There was even more room for “revealing” new kulaks. They tried to raise the number of individual taxpayers to the desired levels by including in their lists the “disenfranchised” and members of the clergy. In 1929, the PCF of the KASSR ordered its local branches “… to conduct special operations to identify the income of the clergy (mullahs) for the purpose of individual taxation.” In March 1930, it was clearly indicated that the “clergy living in rural areas, regardless of whether they were involved in agriculture or not, had to pay agricultural taxes on an individual basis.” On 15 September 1929, in other words, before the PCF of the RSFSR distributed the aforementioned circular, throughout
the republic there were 3,186 household that had been levied individual agricultural taxes. By 1 December 1929, their number had increased to 4,668. The amount of taxes collected from kulak farms during these two and a half months was more than 2.03 million rubles.\(^1\) From 1927 until the end of November 1929 in Osh Okrug, 23% of all taxes and charges collected were taken from kulak farms, which made up a mere 1.88% of all the households in the region.\(^2\)

Almost all of the party and financial institutions’ documents warn local authorities about not levying individual taxes on middle-class and poor households. As the number of real-life kulak farms did not reach the established guidelines of the center, warnings to the country’s authorities on excessive taxation were thwarted by categorical instructions on raising the number of individual taxpayers to the stated levels. The decisions of the party and economic institutions had a tendency to blur the differences between kulaks and the prosperous. The latter were taxed at higher rates, but were not subject to individual taxation.\(^3\)

While individual taxation rates were very high during the 1928–29 tax year and therefore devastated well-to-do households, the following year, middle-income, in some cases very poor, households joined their ranks as well.\(^4\) Because of pressure from above, and because of many subjective reasons, the accounting committees of village councils did not bother with estimates that were incomprehensible for most of their semi-literate members and added all farms that they considered to be “… rich by local standards” to the list of kulaks.\(^5\) Any villager could end up among the kulaks as a result of: a visual inspection; because of ill-wishers’ reports about the presence of hidden assets; or at the whim of the local authority, or under the pressure of district authorities. Agricultural taxes were initially used to take away the surplus revenue of the richer part of the population. Later, they turned into a means of destroying and virtually eliminating the most solvent and strong households. That the solvency of the rural population during this period was very low is supported by the fact that, by the spring of 1930, the total increase in the amount of arrears on all types of peasant payments in the country was 497%. In particular, in Osh Okrug the total amount of arrears was 1.3 million rubles, i.e., more than 40% of total debt in the country.

Peasants, even poor people, would not and could not effectively use available opportunities to raise and develop their households for fear of being included on the list of kulak farms. Contrary to common sense, productive work could lead to ruin. Being categorized as a kulak farm also led to a mechanical increase in other fees and charges. To pay these charges, people had no choice but to sell all of their possessions. They were simply forced to do it. Otherwise they faced fines and risked having their inventories and property seized. Heads of households faced repression. After reviewing the results of the 1929–30 agricultural taxation campaign in April 1930, the Executive Bureau of the Osh Okug AUCP (b) stated that only 1.9% of households in the okrug had been subjected to individual taxation when, in fact, their target level had been 2.5%. Judicial authorities gave strict orders on strengthening repression against debtors.\(^6\) Soon after in Aravan-Bura District, which was behind all the others in identifying kulak farms, the percentage of kulak farms was increased from 1.2% to 2.1% (363 people).\(^7\) The same thing was observed in other districts of the okrug. Despite the requirement that “… the kulaks should be identified in full without being limited to lists of those to be levied agricultural taxes on an individual basis,” they were not able to either reach the stated level of “3 percent” in 1928–29 or the 1929–30 level of “at least 3 percent,” let alone the “4–5 percent” established by the Central Asian Bureau and the Kyrgyz Oblast Committee of the AUCP (b) in January 1930.\(^8\) According to the instructions of the RSFSR People’s Commissariat for Finance, with the transition to complete collectivization, the number of kulak farms in these areas had to be increased by 25–30% compared to 1929–30. The criteria for classifying households as kulaks were expanded.\(^9\)

District tax commissions were instructed to subject
individual taxation to farms that “… resorted to self-dispossession in order to avoid being taxed individually.” On 9 August 1930, there were 3,095 kulak farms (1,173 or 1.3% of them in Osh Okrug) in the country. They made up 1.5% of the total number of farms. On the basis of archival documents, we can trace four important stages in the application of tax legislation for the purpose of excluding and eliminating prosperous social strata in the countryside during the period being studied:

1. **Late 1928–29:** Agricultural taxes, which were initially used to take away the surplus revenue of the richer part of the population, were turned into a means of destroying and virtually eliminating the most solvent and strongest households. By imposing taxes individually, they completed the elimination of about 1% of wealthy households in Osh Okrug. Punitive measures against the now insolvent farms were strengthened. While levying taxes the concepts of “kulak” and “prosperous” were mixed up. Active measures were also taken to subject members of religious cults to individual taxation.

2. **January–March 1930:** The policy of “restricting the exploiting opportunities of kulaks” who were identified based on tax accounting as well as accounting which had been implemented prior to that time (mainly by economic methods) was discarded. The property of not only kulaks, but also of other wealthy households, often middle-class peasants, were confiscated and transferred to the hastily organized collective farms. Unfounded dispossession and eviction became widespread.

3. **The second half of 1930–32: De-kulakization** was implemented by seizing the property of households that had already been ravaged with exorbitant taxes. There were more and more cases of “losing a kulak” and the disappearance of the middle-class peasants “… as the central figure of the village.” As people living on unearned income,” religious people were subjected to individual taxation without reservation. Households which had previously been considered as kulak and prosperous were declared “… to have resorted to the liquidation of kulak signs in order to avoid facing agricultural taxes on an individual basis.” This was the basis for their repression and eviction from the country.

4. **1933–36:** Taxation policy, particularly the imposition of individual taxes, turned into a ruthless instrument of administrative-command system. “... from time to time it fell upon some farms and kept everyone in constant fear. It hung over every individual farmer’s head as a sword of Damocles and served as a constant reminder of the main ‘advantage’ of kolkhoz life: that it was the only thing that protected people from individual taxation.”

**“Solid tasks” on harvesting grains and cotton**

Xenophobia was used mainly to solve production problems. Because of it, alienated social groups and, indeed, the majority of the working population faced violence. It was one of the reasons for tightening repression. It also created a backlash and increased the number of victims. A clear example of this is the implementation of, from 1929 onwards, the so-called “economic-policy campaigns,” most of which were confined to the cycles of agricultural production (e.g., campaigns on harvesting grains and cotton, producing meat, etc.).

Slow progress or failures were always explained away by the activities of class enemies, i.e., by those who were classified as “alien.” The consequences of departing from the principles of the NEP became apparent in the south of Kyrgyzstan during the 1929 grain procurement season. The authorities once again started to appropriate surplus bread, and check neighbourhoods and search households suspected of concealing bread. Agricultural and cattle farms, whose
heads had been disenfranchised and levied agricultural taxes on an individual basis, were forced to do so-called “hard tasks” on growing and delivering grains to the state. “When a sufficient number of individuals feel hatred toward any group of people, they can use some tools directed against this group solely because of their psychological state (although there can be all sorts of excuses). And, of course, violence is the main instrument in these cases. However, violence is condemned by all and is contrary to the law. Therefore, often some sort of preventive measures, such as provocation, set-ups, propaganda and changes in legislation are used. They protect the xenophobes from being prosecuted. Thus, social xenophobia slowly but surely leads to unjustified violence.”

In June 1929, village councils, the qualitative composition of which was described above, were given the right to impose administrative penalties on households not performing their tasks. The penalties were up to five times the cost of delivering bread and were accompanied with property confiscation. When people refused to deliver bread or resisted grain procurement, village councils could independently initiate criminal proceedings against the perpetrators under Part 3 of Article 61 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Villages entered the era of the double yoke of policy planning and bureaucratic command of the Communist Party which dictated where, what and how to plant as well as how to care for and harvest crops. All this took place without taking into account agronomic feasibility, the local climate and the natural conditions of the region. In 1929–30, Osh Okrug was ordered to harvest 2 million poods [Translator’s note: a pood is a unit of weight equal to 36.1 pounds or 16.39 kg] of grains. While determining grain procurement, yield figures, just like the tasks themselves, were pulled out of a hat. The plan was allotted to all districts and rural councils of the okrugs. In August 1929, the Osh Okrug Executive Committee, faced with difficulties in implementing the plan, asked the government to authorize a decree “about the application of the decision of the Central Executive Committee on the obligation of settlements and villages to deliver grain surpluses in the villages of Jalal-Abad, Uzgen, Bazar-Kurgon and Nookat districts.” The fact that it was authorized is supported by the content of the order which obliged the district executive committees “…to immediately apply the decree of the Central Executive Committee in the approved villages … Regardless of anything, relentlessly, I reiterate this, relentlessly put pressure on kulaks and take measures against the failure to deliver bread in Jalal-Abad and Uzgen districts based on the decisions made during [people’s] gatherings.”

Only the poor and farmers were allowed to take part in such gatherings where “hard tasks” on procuring grains were allocated to neighbourhoods. Since the tasks depended on the social status and material condition of farmers, the poor in the countryside were interested in allocating the main part of the plan to their more affluent neighbours who had previously appeared in lists of the disfranchised, had been taxed individually or paid taxes with interest rates (i.e., the wealthy). “Bread troikas”, hundreds of party and Soviet workers, and numerous commissioners made up of “activists” to promote grain procurement began to force farmers and herdsmen to do ever more challenging tasks by imposing fines, selling off their property, and arresting and imposing those who resisted. They also “brought the plan to middle-class and poor households” and forcibly allotted the plan to these households, sold off the property of middle-class households and conducted searches. They actively began to enforce whistle blowing. Those who informed about people hiding bread received a 25% share of what was found.

Requirements of the regional committees of the AUCP (b) entailed the strengthening of repressive measures and a worsening of the social situation. They strongly emphasized that “… district troikas and commissioners must take a particularly intransigent position concerning prosperous farms. They had to take severe measures against them, including arresting them, writing up their property, and taking them to court. The bread of prosperous farms needs to be collected first by giving them a short time …” The Kyrgyz Oblast Committee tried to keep under review controlling...
the campaign against *kulaks* by emphasizing in its guidelines “... the importance of grain procurement as a political campaign” and stating that during the period of grain procurement a major political task of the party organization should be paying increased attention to the fight against *kulaks* and that the pressure on *kulaks* during grain procurement should mainly manifest itself in: the organization of a wide community of poor and middle-class peasants against any attempts of *kulaks* to disrupt the grain procurement campaign; exposing these attempts; and determining their true meaning and significance. The People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (PCA) of the republic also became involved and stated that the need to supply the state with 6.4 million *poods* of grain necessitated targeting those elements of the village who resist grain procurement by strengthening the influence on middle-class peasants. The results soon became apparent. There was widespread lawlessness and violence against not only *kulaks* and the rich, but also against the poor who had grain crops. Cotton-growers and cattle breeders were also ordered to procure grains. Only the top-down plan was taken into account and the real economic capacity of the farms was disregarded. They took everything, even seeds. Herders were forced to perform these tasks by selling their cattle. Relevant articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code made it possible to bring to justice all those who in one way or another ended up among those suspected of hiding bread, resisted procurement (Article 61), engaged in malicious sabotage and profiteering (Articles 107, 131, etc.), or refused to sell grain at prices fixed by the state (which were 4–5 times lower than market prices). These articles were mainly used in cotton and grain-growing areas. In October 1929, the authorities tried to somehow organize the process of distributing grain harvesting plans among farms, but repression against *kulaks* and wealthy households was left unchanged. As admitted by the leadership of the Executive Committee of Osh Okrug, grain procurements in 1929 were the main reason for the reemergence of *basmachis* in the autumn of 1929. A resolution of the plenum of the party organization of the okrug noted that the emergence of “*basmachi gangs*” in the okrug was a result of “... the revival of the resistance of class enemies.”

In December 1929, the Central Asian Economic Council recommended to councils of people’s commissars to issue a decision providing district executive committees and village councils with the authority to impose fines up to five times the cost of what was not submitted. In addition, those who failed to submit their share were to be brought to justice with the help of show trials, have their property confiscated and be expelled from the okrug. For the first time, heads of cotton-growing districts were officially told to search all households suspected of concealing cotton. The idea of “enemies” in the person of “cotton hoarders,” “saboteurs of raw cotton” and “opponents of the cotton program” served to explain the impossibility of performing the authorities’ orders. This was a real escape for the authorities and therefore was created on a giant scale. Recommendations of the Central Asian Economic Council were sent to the leadership in the 3 January 1930 decision of the PCF of the KASSR: “On the Harvesting of Crops and the Repayment of Advances.” A sharp increase in the number of convicted in Aravan-Bura District attests to the progress made in the search for imaginary enemies, and the beginning of rampant lawlessness and repression of cotton growers.

The Kyrgyz Oblast Committee of the AUCP (b) accused the okrug committee of the party of leaning to the right and stated that the party organization and the Soviet apparatus of the okrug “… did not put sufficient pressure on *kulaks*, the prosperous members of the village who possess more than half of raw cotton” and suggested carrying out a second round of verification and confiscating their property and bringing to justice those not executing the plan. Each district was prescribed to organize troikas on harvesting cotton, which had to be composed of representatives of the prosecutor’s office and the SPD [State Political Directorate]. They were given the right to make
decisions on seizing and confiscating the property of kulaks and the wealthy. Those who reported hidden cotton were supposed to receive a 15% share of what was detected. The whole party and Soviet and co-operative apparatus was set in motion. From then on, house searches, confiscation of everything that contained raw cotton (e.g., blankets, bathrobes, etc.), raids on markets, fines, confiscation of property for failure to fulfill assignments and imprisonment for non-compliance would become one of the daily activities of the authorities. As acknowledged by Morin, the chairman of the Kyrgyz Cotton Union: “… even after mass self-tests, raids of yards and fields, and repressive measures against kulaks and malicious undersuppliers,” they failed to fulfill the plan on collecting raw cotton. Openly declaring that the plans were not realistic and were out of line with the real possibilities of cotton growers meant that higher authorities were wrong. Stalin’s henchmen preferred torturing their people to falling out of favour with their leader.

Archival documents give every reason to believe that the decrees of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) and the Kyrgyz Oblast Committee of the AUCP (b) on increasing the number of wealthy kulak farms up to 3% in 1929 and up to 4–5% in the autumn of 1930 stemmed from the need to fulfill the main part of the procurement of agricultural raw materials at their expense by giving them “solid tasks.” For example, in 1930, collective farms in Aravan-Bura District (with 5,890 members) handed over 2,958.8 tonnes of cotton (as of 11 January 1931). Thus, each farmer’s input was 502 kg (kilograms). “Kulaks and the wealthy” (178 people), on the other hand, handed over 370 tonnes. Thus, each kulak’s share was 2,079 kg. For failure to carry out “solid tasks,” kulaks and the wealthy, in addition to being prosecuted, were fined 71,000 rubles. Sixteen farms had their property confiscated. As for grain procurement, as of 5 December 1930, collective farms handed over 3,120.80 quintals. Each farmer’s share was 52.9 kg. “Kulaks and the wealthy” (96 people) prepared 1,335.02 quintals. Thus, each kulak’s share was 1,390.6 kg. Ten farms were fined 2,434 rubles 73 kopecks for failure to fulfill the plan. A total of 36 farms (in addition to being prosecuted) were fined 69,000 rubles for failing to carry out “solid tasks” during the year. In addition, 225 sheep, 20 camels, 25 head of cattle and two mills were seized. In 1931, more than 10% of the grain procurement plan of the district (34,040 quintals) was to be implemented by the “well-off kulak” farms (3,800 quintals). For failure to accomplish the plan during this year, 61 farms had their property confiscated and two were fined. In 1932, collective farms paid 115,200 rubles as agricultural taxes. Each farmer’s share was 24 rubles. At the same time, every kulak farm paid an average of 600 rubles: in 1933–1,033; and in 1934–1,090 rubles. The amount of tax levied on ordinary farmers during these years was in the range of 24–25 rubles.

Even more severe tests awaited “kulak elements” and cotton growers as a whole in southern Kyrgyzstan districts in the coming years. During these years, procurement plans were made basically impossible. Orders were issued to increase the number of kulaks and the wealthy. Repressive measures against individual farmers became more and more stringent. They started cleansing collective farms from “kulak agents.” After the okrug was abolished, representatives of the center and Central Asian party-economic organizations took direct control over repression and harvesting. Artificially inflated class struggle became interwoven with the fight for cotton and took more and more inhumane forms. Identifying new “kulaks” and “kulak agents,” ordering them to do inflated “solid tasks” and the repression of those who were unable to perform the unrealistic tasks turned into one of the main tasks of the party as well as punitive organs. Every year, with the start of the cotton harvest season in the month of September, teams of judges composed of a judge, a public investigator and a police officer were sent to cotton-growing districts. Their task was “… to carry out show trials against kulaks and the wealthy who fail to hand over the harvest on schedule.”
Initially, difficulties encountered in successfully sowing and harvesting cotton and grains were attributed to the subversive activities of bay-manaps, kulaks, the wealthy, and the “vermin” among cooperative organizations, workers of the party and Soviet authorities. Following the official announcement about the completion of the process of eliminating kulaks, starting from 1933, they began to point to the peasants who had fallen under the influence of the “remnants of” the kulaks. The image of the “enemy” was necessary for attributing the authorities’ failures, agricultural production failures and the inefficient work of collectivized farms to the enemy’s “schemes,” and for explaining difficulties in everyday life (shortages of food, household items and so forth). The image of the “enemy” also kept the masses in social tension, making it easier to crack down on dissent and suppress possible attempts at resistance from those unhappy with the state’s policy. The only proof incriminating the victim was their affiliation with the image of the “enemy” that was created based on the circumstances at hand.

In the context of the emerging totalitarian regime, replacing religious consciousness with atheism was made one of the most important tasks of the party and the state. It was conducted in a very primitive, brutal and barbaric manner. From 1918 to 1932, 219 mosques and churches, 63 chapels and 16 schools were closed in the country. The buildings of 12 mosques and four churches—the most valuable monuments of the history, architecture and art of the local population—were demolished. By 1 April 1932, 170 objects of worship had been converted and were being used for other purposes; 106 had been left unused. This led to their gradual destruction. According to incomplete statistics on the nine rural councils of Bazar Kurgan-District, of the 59 mosques closed during the stated years, 16 were closed in 1929–30, 43 in the next two years, 54 of them were abandoned (“… local teachers refuse to teach children in these places” stated a document), only two were turned into schools and three into cooperatives. Militant atheism, which Soviet authorities made a basis of party activities in the field, contributed to the fact that the clergy were driven out of public life. The faithful were afraid to go to mosque or admit their faith. Urazbekov District is a good example. In 1932, of the existing 40 mosques, only 23 were functioning and had 433 members. None of them had imams. “… When the issue of transferring the buildings of mosques to schools or other cultural institutions is raised, citizens refrain [from voting], no one votes for or against…,” noted a letter that was sent from the district to the CEC secretariat of the KASSR. The believers were afraid to openly protest against the closure of mosques.

Failed campaigns led to increased repression of the “aliens.” Describing the course of the grain procurement campaign in 1929, the Okrug Executive Committee noted that “… class contradictions in the village have become widespread. Along with the rise of bays and kulaks who strived to reduce the rate of grain procurement, they noted increasing activeness of kulak agents who tried to openly promote the influence of bays. In Osh Okrug there were a series of show trials of those who opposed grain procurement. These trials had a significant impact.”

Only one judicial district (out of 13) serving Aravan-Bura District processed 196 cases related to grain procurement from September 1929 to December 1929. From January 1930 to February 1930, 622 new cases were received. During one of the periodic field trials, which lasted for eight days in January 1930, 68 administrative and criminal cases (related to the procurement campaign) were considered in four rural councils of Aravan-Bura District. Fourteen people were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment and five head of cattle and 130 sheep were confiscated. During two sessions between 1–8 November 1930, which were attended by the district prosecutor, national investigators, a police chief and police officers, 28 kulaks and the wealthy residing in the district were convicted under articles 131 and 61 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. By the end of 1930, the number imprisoned for failing to harvest enough cotton had reached 92 people. Of these, 65
were “kulaks and wealthy” and seven were middle-class peasants. During another session of the court, which took place from 13 April to 21 April 1931, it was determined that, in seven village councils (out of 16), of 119 people who were about to be condemned as “kulaks and wealthy,” 30 had previously been convicted and served in prison, and 26 had fled during preparations for the planting season. Before the start of each campaign, judicial authorities ordered that “… a few kulak and wealthy elites be selected from among the dodgers in each district (those who did not hand over grain, cotton, meat, wool, etc.) and prosecuted under Article 131 of the Criminal Code (any matter related to the campaign could be prosecuted under articles 131 and 61).” The prosecutors were told to demand a measure of social protection with confiscation of property and with subsequent expulsion from the territory of the country or the okrug.

From September to December 1931, in Jalal-Abad District, 243 “kulaks and wealthy” were convicted for failing to perform “hard tasks,” four middle-class peasants were convicted for failure to comply with the terms of the contracts, seven cotton growers were convicted for cleaning cotton seeds for domestic use, 48 people—members of village councils, boards of collective farms, brigade leaders and commissioners—were convicted for negligence and omissions while preparing raw cotton. Property was seized from 204 convicts and 84 people were sentenced to deportation after serving their sentence. During the same year, 216 “kulaks and wealthy” and 12 middle-class peasants were convicted for [failing to submit] bread, 37 people were sentenced to deportation after serving their sentence, and 130 had their property confiscated. During the spring sowing campaign of 1932, over the course of 20 days in April, 315 “kulaks and wealthy” (of which 147 managed to escape before being arrested) were sentenced to prison and 419 were sentenced to expulsion for failing to fulfill the planting plans in five districts of southern Kyrgyzstan (Aravan-Bura, Jalal-Abad, Uzgen, Bazar-Kurgan and Alai-Gulcha). To depict the attitude of the population about what was happening, the public prosecutor described one episode of the trial of a group of “kulaks and the wealthy” in Jalal-Abad District: “… During a show trial which was held by a visiting session of the main court and which was attended by the prosecutor, it was determined that of the 14 defendants involved in the case, 12 were the most influential baymanaps. They had had most of their property and land confiscated. However, they still possessed significant wealth and were not given hard tasks because of the support of the village council employees. The following simple fact is a clear indication of their huge impact: when they were brought by car to the place of the hearing, the peasants who were waiting for the trial as if on cue stood up and took off their hats. There were about 500 of them.”

Collective farms were periodically cleaned of “alien” elements to implement production tasks and keep others in fear. Following the “cleanups,” former collective farmers were given solid tasks on preparing agricultural products. Their property was transferred to collective farms. According to data on three southern districts (Bazar-Kurgan, Nookat and Kyzyl-Jar), in 1931–32, 389 people were excluded from kolkhozes. Thirteen households were excluded from the kolkhozes of Aravan-Bura District in 1931; in 1932–536; in 1933–202; and in 1934–123. From early 1933 until 20 May 1934, 270 households were expelled from the collective farms of Alai-Gulcha District. In addition, 72 of them were dispossessed. In May 1932, a large, specially organized group of “kulaks and bays” were expelled from the cotton growing districts of southern Kyrgyzstan. An analysis of the protocols of the meetings of the political quintet at the Aravan-Bura RC of the AUCP (b), statements of the evicted and villagers’ petitions give reason to believe that the vast majority (149 people including family members) were included on the lists solely on the basis of suspicions and unproven denunciations. Others were listed on the basis of their social origins. Another document provides an even more terrifying picture of the events: in late August 1931, A. Shakhray, secretary of the...
Kyrgyz Oblast Committee of the AUCP (b), requested B. Semenov, second secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b), provide him with the details of the mass shooting of people evicted from Osh Okrug in Andijan: “around 150 arrested bay-manaps from the Alai Valley were leaving Kyrgyzstan from the Andijan 1 train station. When people tried to escape the cars, the convoy opened fire and killed 127 people. They were brought to Osh and buried ...”

Prisons were overcrowded with prisoners and those awaiting trial. As of 1 March 1929, Kyrgyzstan’s detention facilities, which were designed to hold 830 people, had 931 prisoners, including 341 people in the Osh city prison and the detention facility in Jalal-Abad. It was noted that extreme overcrowding, poor nutrition and a complete absence of health care were widespread in the prisons. In October 1929, the chief of the central prison in the city of Frunze, which was designed for 120 inmates, pointed out that “… starting with the third quarter of the last 1928–29 operating year (March–May 1929), the number of prisoners did not decrease. On the contrary, it increased and reached 480 people ... By 1 October the number of prisoners had reached 532.”

In November of the same year, due to overcrowding and the threat of epidemics in the Osh prison, the okrug attorney informed the People’s Commissariat of Justice (PCJ) of the republic about transferring some of the prisoners to the concentration camp of the Permanent Mission of the Joint State Political Administration in Central Asia and requested transferring 30–40 people to Frunze. In March 1931, the number of inmates in the central prison excluding those who were in pre-trial detention reached 1,238. The Osh prison had 1,100 inmates. It was proposed to the OGPU to urgently take 172 people to concentration camps, 150 people to – an agricultural prison and to close the Frunze prison to new inmates. More than 80% of prisoners had, in the past, engaged in agriculture; 30% were over the age of 60. On 10 May 1932, the Jalal-Abad detention centre, which was designed for 40 people, had 612 people, including 17 people sentenced to the capital punishment. In March 1932, Tochilsky, chief of the investigative and political department of the OGPU, conducted a survey of the Osh detention centre and noted that the detention centre designed for 175 people contained 1,587 people on 13 March; and “… there is colossal crowding and almost everyone is heavily infected with lice.” Some of the prisoners were suffering from typhoid fever and scurvy. There was not enough food and very little health care. In 1932, all six prisons were reorganized into insulators, and all 14 jails designed for the maintenance of 5,050 prisoners were turned into detention centres, i.e., into places of gathering and transferring convicts to prisons and concentration camps of the OGPU. “… The legitimate increase in the number of prisoners as a result of the intensification of class struggle dictates the need for reorganizing the existing correctional labor institutions,” noted the people’s commissar of justice in his quarterly bulletin.

In the first quarter of 1932, the detention centres contained 5,632 people. An absolute majority (the documents state “up to 94 percent”) were listed by the Central Asian Office of the OGPU. From 1 January 1932 to 1 March 1933, 1,990 people were convicted throughout the country in cases related to the grain procurement campaign; 56 of them were sentenced to capital punishment. During the first half of 1933, 742 people were charged with similar crimes by the country’s main court; 232 of them were sentenced to death.
III. SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLICY OF EXCLUSION

Government Policy towards the Victims of the Stalinist Regime’s Xenophobic Policies

The severity of the tax burden, forced harvesting, violence and coercion in collectivization, violation of religious freedoms of the population and mass repression led to the escalation of passive, seemingly “peaceful” forms of resistance to the violence and lawlessness into mass demonstrations and a renewal of “basmachis” against collectivization and dispossession—and against Soviet rule in general. In the autumn of 1929, in Kyzyl-Kiya, Nookat, Uzgen and Kyzyl-Jar districts, farmers and ranchers who had escaped from implementing hard tasks began to put up armed resistance against grain procurement. In October, in Kyzyl-Jar District, a rebellion broke out and the Uzgen District Executive Committee’s building was burned down. In April 1930, there were six armed groups in the territory of Bazaar-Kurgan District. In May, basmachis occupied the central part of Alai-Gulcha District. Active armed resistance lasted until the end of 1932. According to existing data, during the mass campaign conducted in early November 1930 to eliminate basmachis and their supporters, 631 people were arrested in the southern Kyrgyzstan (more than 600 people excluding armed groups that had been liquidated previously and those who surrendered). According to the Southern Kyrgyz Operational Sector of the United State Political Administration (SKOS USPA), in 1932, 17 armed groups were liquidated. During the course of these military operations, 114 people were killed and 403 were captured. Eighteen groups were eliminated before the armed campaign started. 2,771 peaceful farmers and herdsmen were arrested as accomplices and former basmachis. Of those killed and arrested, only 627 had weapons, mostly hunting shotguns. Among Joint State Political Directorate troops, police officers and volunteer corps, a total of nine people were killed and eight wounded.

Some victims migrated to remote mountain areas, neighbouring countries or China. Archival documents suggest that all those who had a chance, including farmers, had to flee. Despite the efforts of the Joint State Political Directorate (a wide network of agents in the highlands and areas next to China, increases in the number of border guards on the outposts, periodical “removals” of all potential refugees, full support of initiatives to create so-called volunteer corps, etc.), the escape from permanent places of residence happened en masse. At the beginning of 1930, 300 nomadic households left the Alai Valley. In June 1930, the authorized representative of the Kyrgyz Oblast Committee of the AUCP (b) in Osh Okrug noted the emigration of about 100 households to China. In July, 49 households left Nookat. In December 1932, 170 households left the bordering villages of Alai District. In 1932, and the first quarter of 1933, 1,000 households left Kyzyl-Kiya District for the neighbouring country. During preparations for the 1933 planting season, 197 households residing in two villages of Nookat District fled the country to avoid doing hard tasks.

Other cotton-growing districts lost 532 households. Jalal-Abad District lost 436 households. By 20 December 1933, the mountainous areas of Ketmen-Tyube District had 805 households who had migrated from other districts. In 1933, emigration intensified in bordering villages of Alai-Gulcha District. According to B. Isakeev, deputy secretary of the Kyrgyz Oblast Committee of the AUCP (b), the mass emigrations were organized by “… bay-manaps who had been expelled from collective farms, deported from the districts, or had been convicted in a court of law.” In 1934, there were 600 households in Murghab District of Tajikistan who had migrated there in 1933.
The so-called “economic-political campaigns” that were carried out with the help of administrative command methods—in a brutal manner—and the mass collectivization of individual farms relied on xenophobia, and led to the fact that rural workers “… lost not only the conscious, but instinctive need to work…” Land plots lost their most enthusiastic, enterprising and experienced owners. Traditional agricultural and livestock farms were degraded. The vast majority of farmers and herdsmen became virtually “… day laborers who were not interested in the final results of their work.” Farmers began to view “… cotton growing not as a production process they needed, but as a public service.” Only in 1935, six years after the adoption of the three-year “cotton program,” were they able to harvest the amount stipulated in the 1929–30 financial year (a little over 40,000 tonnes). At the end of the first five-year period, productivity decreased from 9.84 quintals in 1927–28 to 6.7 quintals. The 1932 goal of a total of 124 tonnes was attained only in 1962. Up until the 1940s, the Soviets were not able to stabilize the capacity to produce major agricultural crops.

The consequences of eliminating bay-manaps in pastoral districts significantly affected not only the local society structure, but it also influenced economic development. From 7,715,000 head of cattle counted in 1928, only 2.2 million were left by 1934. The new ideology rejected the old, but did not have a valuable and sustainable basis for the preservation of moral foundations of society. On the contrary, under the pretext of eradicating religion, they struck a major blow to many truly popular, positive traditions, customs and rituals of the people of southern Kyrgyzstan.

Archival documents show that these repressions, which were a result of the Bolsheviks’ xenophobic policies, did not enjoy the people’s support. Rural communities, which were in a permanent relationship with the process of sating their socio-cultural and economic needs, knew their members well and, as a result, the xenophobic campaigns of the authorities were not very effective. The documents also contain numerous cases when the dispossessed and repressed “kulak” and wealthy households received sympathy and assistance not only from the general population (in the form of collecting money for the families of convicted kulaks, temporarily sheltering neighbours’ property to prevent confiscation, assisting in planting and harvesting, and so forth), but also from some of the forensic investigators, tax authorities and village councils (not convicting those who failed to perform solid tasks, canceling trips to identify new kulak farms, avoiding giving solid tasks and so forth). Declassified documents also cite numerous instances when the local population helped “basmachi” groups by providing them with food, asking for their help in response to the arbitrary arrests of activists, taking part in the mass destruction of party and co-operative organizations during the attacks of “basmachis” on district centers, and providing the Joint State Political Directorate with false information about basmachi groups, etc.

My research suggests that unlike countries that have radically broken away from their totalitarian past, in Kyrgyzstan there are no sincere efforts to appreciate and understand the Soviet past or to honour the memory of innocent victims of the communist regime’s xenophobic policies. As a consequence, a large part of the population still remains committed to communist ideology and Soviet myths. Reminders of the Soviet past are everywhere: four administrative districts of the capital city Bishkek continue to bear the names of xenophobic Bolshevik leaders (Lenin and Sverdlov) and communist holidays (Pervomaisky and October, etc.). The city is also home to a square and an imposing monument to the “Fighters of Revolution.” There is also an “eternal flame” in their honour. There is also a memorial museum dedicated to Mikhail Frunze. The southern capital, that is, Osh City, hosts the largest statue of Lenin in Central Asia. Next to it is a memorial complex with an eternal flame dedicated to those who “died in the struggle for the establishment of Soviet rule.” Osh City’s only avenue is named...
after the last leader of the country’s Communist Party. A total of 59 localities in Osh Province still bear the names of ideologues of communism, Marx and Engels, as well as Bolshevik leaders (Lenin, Kalinin, Telman), Red commanders (Chapaev, Frunze) and local victims of the Stalinist policy of “class struggle” (Kychan Jakypov, Urkuya Salieva, etc.). Kyrgyzstan is the only former Soviet country where the status of former communist parties has not changed. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Eurasian Monitor, an international research agency, Kyrgyzstan ranks first among the former Soviet countries with the largest number of adherents to communist ideology, and images and ideals of the Soviet era. While in Russia itself 38% of the respondents view Stalin unfavourably, in Kyrgyzstan they make up only 11%.

Strengthening social sympathy towards Russia, which is striving to revive its status as a military superpower, gradually transferring control over strategic sectors of the economy to Moscow, membership in the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC or EurAsEC), corruption, and transferring control over all branches of government, personnel policy and resources to the president, as well as attempts to amend Kyrgyzstan’s constitution all support political scientist E. Lezina’s statement that “… the desire to silence such aspects of the past like repressions and genocides weakens democratic potential and reduces the level of democratic political culture. Experience has shown that post-totalitarian and post-authoritarian societies which deny or do not clearly assess the past and which have experienced a state-organized system of terror tend to reproduce [some of] the features of previous regimes.”
NOTES

1 “Social xenophobia (Greek xenos: foreigner, phobos: fear) is a feature of a society which manifests itself in a negative attitude towards social communities or individuals perceived as alien and therefore emotionally unacceptable and hostile. During the years of Soviet rule, there was imposed, or, more precisely, an imposed state of fear and hatred of strangers. Merchants, nobles, clergymen, kulaks, as well as representatives of many parties and social movements played the role of the enemy at different times. As a feature of the mentality of the Soviet society, social xenophobia (SX) in the consciousness of an individual was expressed in suspicion, confidence in hostile intentions, justification of sanctions and repressions, insincerity and falsehood, and the deliberate moral advantage of the proletariat in comparison with representatives of other classes. At different stages of the history of the USSR, SX acquired different ideological and administrative forms. The concept of ‘enemy of the people’ became widespread and was interpreted arbitrarily. Because of the efforts and propaganda of the Soviet apparatus in the 1930s and 1940s, SX became entrenched in the minds of many Soviet people.” http://psychology_lexicon.academic.ru; A. Makarchuk and G. Soldatova, “Xenophobia as a socially dangerous phenomenon,” accessed 18 March 2018, http://psyfactor.org/lib/xenophobia2.htm.

2 In the early years of Soviet power, southern Kyrgyzstan was part of the Turkestan ASSR (1918–1924). Following national-territorial demarcation, two administrative-territorial units, Osh and Jalal-Abad okrugs (from December 1926 to December 1928 they were called cantons), were created in the Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast. During the transition to the district system at the end of 1928, Jalal-Abad and Osh okrugs were united into Osh Okrug. www.classes.ru; www.el-sozduk.kg; www.slovari.bibliofond.ru.

3 Osh Oblast State Archive (OOSA) fond (f.) 1, opis (op.) 1, delo (d.) 338, list (l.) 96. About adding Osh Okrug to the list of okrugs with which direct and constant communication has been established. Telegram of the Central Asian Bureau of the CC (Central Committee) of the AUCP (b), 19 February 1930. Translator’s note: fond corresponds to fund; opis means register; delo means file; and list corresponds to page.

4 Bais—rich people, the well-to-do; manaps—representatives of Kyrgyz feudal-clan aristocracy. Members of their clan recognized their adjudicative power and their leadership in wartime. Their main duty was to protect the interests of their tribe and clan as well as to ensure the livelihoods and survival of their subjects. www.classes.ru; www.el-sozduk.kg; www.slovari.bibliofond.ru.


6 J.S. Baktygulov, B.M. Zima, A.K. Kanimetov and V.P. Sherstobitov, eds. (1983), Sovetskiy Kirghizstan v dokumentakh 1917–67 [Soviet Kirghizstan in documents 1917–67] (Frunze, Kyrgyzstan), 214; V. Zelikov (1967), Pechat’– boevoye oruhiye partorganizatsii v bor’be za pobedu kolkhoznogo stroya (1928–33) [The Press - Combat Weapon of the Political Party Organization in its Fight for the Victory of the Collective-Farming System (1928-1933)], no. IV (Frunze), 179–80. The Institute of Party History under the CC of the CP (Communist Party) of Kirghizia, a branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CC of the CPSU.

7 By 1926, 90.7% of the population over the age of nine was illiterate. D. Dzhunushaliev (1993), «Kyrgyzstan: preobrazovatel’nuye protsessy 20–30-

8 Zelikov (1967), 193.

9 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 298, l. 16. A memorandum on the political situation in the former Chatkal volost in connection with the emergence of basmachism, November 1929.

10 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 192, l. 309–12. Minutes No. 145 of the united meeting of the CEC and the CPC (Council of People’s Commissars) of the KASSR. Copy, 4 February 1929.


12 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 192, l. 55. To the Osh Okrispolkom [Okrug Executive Committee], all cantispolkoms [canton executive committees] and RECs (raion executive committees), 1 April 1929. It should be noted that this promise, like many others, was not fulfilled. Unorganized evictions by court rulings and a special meeting at the PR (Plenipotentiary Representation) of the OGPU in Central Asia were carried out further: See Ibid., f. 62, op. 1, d. 3, l. 39. Circular of the prosecutor of Osh Okrug to the investigator of Neighborhood 9 Yuldashev, 30 December 1929; Ibid., f. 79. op. 1, d. 12, l. 29. Report of the prosecutor of Aravan-Bura Raion Dzugaev to the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the KASSR, 9 November 1930; Ibid., l. 156 ob. Memorandum of the assistant prosecutor of Aravan-Bura Raion on the trip to Aravan, 22 April 1930; CSA of the KR, f. 21, op. 1c, d. 57, l. 44. A letter from the CEC of the KASSR to the SPA (State Political Administration) about the statement of the exiled Sultanov, November 1930; Ibid., d. 434, l. 38. Telegram of the PR of the OGPU in Central Asia to the secretary of the Kirobcom (Kirghiz Oblast Committee) of the AUCP (b) and the head of the GPU of the KASSR on the arrest and dispatch of “malicious elements of the village” on an individual basis; Ibid., f. 21c, op. 1, d. 112, l. 270. Telegram of the Kirobcom of the AUCP (b) to the RCs (raion committees) of the AUCP (b) in all cotton producing regions, 27 September 1931; the Central State Archive of Political Documentation of the Kyrgyz Republic (CSAPD of the KR), f. 10, op. 1, d. 365, l. 38. Telephonogram of the secretary of Bazar-Kurgan RC of the AUCP (b) to the chief of the South Kirghiz Operational Sector of the OGPU, August 1931; Ibid., d. 365, l. 46. Memo of the secretory of the Kirobcom of the AUCP (b) Shakhrai to the second secretory of the Central Asian Bureau of the CC of the AUCP (b) Semenov, 27 August 1931; Ibid., d. 363, l. 81. Minutes No. 2 of the meeting of the Commission for the Affairs of the Kulaks, Bais and Manaps under the CPC of the KASSR, 25 July 1931.

13 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 298, l. 16. A memo on the political situation in the former Chatkal Volost in connection with the emergence of basmachism, November 1929.


Zelikov (1967), 240.


Dobornozhenko (2010).

B. Chokushev, Klassovaya bor’ba v kirgizskikh ailakh (1918–32 gg) [Class Struggle in Kyrgyz Villages (1918–32)] (Frunze, Ilim, 1989), 76.

OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 37, l. 250. Information on persons deprived of their voting rights in Osh Okrug, 26 December 1929; Report on the work of the government of the Kirghiz ASSR for two years (March 1927–April 1929) to the Second Republican Congress of workers, dekhkans, peasants and Red Army deputies (1931), Frunze, p. 19.

OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 90, l. 27. Statement from a peasant from the of village Pokrovsky to the Election Commission of Osh Okrug, 14 January 1929; Ibid., l. 33 ob. In the CEC of the Kirghiz Republic, Statement from Abdrahmanov Zhusupbek, 19 May 1930; Ibid., d. 94, l. 105, The Osh Okrispolkom. Statement from craftsman Mirbabaev Yakubkadyr, 12 February 1930; Ibid., 6–11 ob; To the Chairman of the Osh District Election Commission from Vasily

OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 148, l. 8. Information on the social composition of village councils of Osh Okrug on the basis of the results of the reporting and re-election campaign of 1928-1929. December 1929.

Circular of the Osh Okrispolkom to all raiispolkoms [Raion Executive Committees] and city councils of Osh Okrug. Explanations on the verification of lists of people deprived of electoral rights, 20 October 1929.


OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 37, l. 250. Information on persons deprived of their voting rights in Osh Okrug, 26 December 1929; D.M. Malabaev (1969), Ukrepleniye Sovetov Kirgizii v period stroitel’stva sotsializma (1917–32) [Strengthening of Soviet Rule in Kirghizia during the Period of Building Socialism (1917–32)] (Frunze, Ilim), 386.

OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 398, l. 5. Information on the lists of the disenfranchised in Osh Okrug as of 5 May 1930; Ibid., 7. Information on the lists of the disenfranchised in Osh Okrug as of 10 June 1930. Ibid., f. 79, op. 1, d. 8, l. 87, 249 ob. Minutes of the meetings of the commission for the revision of lists of the disenfranchised at the Jalal-Abad Raiispolkom, 25 April, 28 May 1930.
Social and Religious Xenophobia as a Policy Instrument of the Soviet Union—History and Lessons Learned (1929–36): The Case of Southern Kyrgyzstan

Zolotarev, 5 May 1930; Ibid., f. 1, op. 1, d. 397, l. 26. Statement from a minister of religious worship Denisov Vasily Ivanovich to the Osh Okrispolkom, 16 December 1928; Ibid., l. 27. Conclusion of the legal adviser and the resolution of the Okrug Election Commission, 24 December 1929; CSA of the KR, f. 21c, op. 16c, d. 103, l. 3. To the Secretariat of the Chairman of the VTsIK, 13 April 1930.

29 Malabaev (1969), 408.

30 Malabaev (1969), 455.

31 OOSA, f. 363, op. 1, d. 63, l. 10–18. Reports of the PCF of the KASSR, reports from the cantonal financial departments for April–July 1926; Ibid., 189–254. Minutes of the finance meeting at the PCF of the KASSR, 10 May 1927.

32 Report on the work of the Government of the Kirghiz ASSR for two years (March 1927–April 1929), the Second All-Kirghiz Republican Congress of the soviets of workers, dekhkans, peasants and Red Army deputies (1929), 35.

33 V.P. Danilov and N.A. Ivnitsky (1989), Dokumenty svidetel stvuyut. Iz istorii derevni nakanune i v khode kollektivizatsii 1927–29 gg [Confirmed by Documents. From the History of Villages Right Before and During the Collectivization of 1927–29] (Moscow, Politizdat), 500, 525.

34 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 297, l. 249. Application to the Osh District Executive Committee from Rybin Mikhail, a resident of the village of Mikhaylovka in Jalal-Abad District, 20 December 1929; Ibid., d. 340, l. 23–35. Minutes No. 3 and No. 4 of the district commission meeting to review the complaints of the disenfranchised, 10, 21 April 1930.


36 CSA of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 285, l. 31. Review of the state of the Osh Okrug Party Organization as of 1 April 1930 based on materials available at the Central Asian Bureau of the AUCP (b).

37 Ibid., l. 44.


41 Circular of the Kirobkom of the AUCP (b), CEC and PCF of the KASSR to the Osh Okrug as well as all canton finance departments, 9 December 1929.

42 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 198, l. 51, 54. Market research on agriculture in Osh Okrug, 25 December 1929.

Social and Religious Xenophobia as a Policy Instrument of the Soviet Union—History and Lessons Learned (1929–36): The Case of Southern Kyrgyzstan


OOSA, f. 363, op. 1, d. 161, l. 32. Circular of the PCF of the KASSR to the Osh Okrug Finance Department, 24 April 1929; Ibid., l. 445; circular of the PCF of the KASSR to the Osh Okrug Finance Department, 30 June 1930.


OOSA, f. 719, op. 1, d. 61. Resolution of the Executive Bureau of the Aravan-Bura RC of the AUCP (b) on the results of the work of the Commission for the Identification of Kulak Farms, 2 November 1930; Ibid., f. 79, op. 1, d. 12, l. 57. Communication to the CEC and CPC of the KASSR “On the Issue of Giving Solid Tasks to Kulak and Prosperous Farms,” 5 December 1930.

OOSA, f. 719, op. 1, d. 61, l. 86. Resolution of the Executive Bureau of the Aravan-Bura RC of the AUCP (b) minutes of the 8 November 1930 meeting; Ibid., l. 124. Resolution of the Executive Bureau of the Aravan-Bura RC of the AUCP (b); minutes of the 24 December 1930 meeting.


Abdrakhmanov, 1916. Dnevni. Pis’ma Stalinu [The Diaries. Letters to Stalin], p.142; OOSA, f. 719, op. 1, d. 61, Protocol of an expanded meeting of the Aravan-Bura RC of the AUCP (b) and the WPE (Workers’-Peasants’ Inspectorate), 15 November 1930.


57 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 238, l. 52. Abstracts for lecturers on grain procurements in Osh Okrug,
June 1929. According to other sources: 1.9 million poods. Ibid., d. 299, l. 42. “About the Grain Balance for the Coming Year and the Preparation for Grain Procurements,” Resolution of the meeting of the Executive Bureau of the Osh Okrug Committee of the AUCP (b), 21 July 1929.


59 Ibid., d. 238, l. 168. Order No. 96 on Osh Okrug, 1 September 1929.


62 Ibid., f. 1, op. 1, d. 136, l. 83, “On the Progress of the Grain Procurement Campaign,” Note No. 7, November 1929. Based on the content of this document, it can be assumed that instructions of the same nature were given in previous letters.

63 Ibid., f. 305, op. 1, d. 635, l. 232. To agricultural workers of the KASSR, October 1929.

64 CSA of the KR, f. 145, op. 1, d. 140, l. 26 ob. Information on grain procurement by the MoJ of the KASSR, 20 December 1929.

65 Ibid., f. 611, op. 1, d. 128. Order No. 109 for Osh Okrug, 20 September 1929; Ibid., f. 79, op. 1, d. 10–18. Statements (of K. Zhaparov, S. Mirakhmedov, Salimbaev, T. Klichev, along with certificates from village soviets) to Uzgen and Naukat raion executive committees on incorrect assignment of solid tasks for harvesting grain, 14, 19 September; 9, 11 October 1929; Abdrakhmanov, 124.


67 CSA of the KR, f. 21c, op. 1, d. 24, l. 515. “On Additional Measures for the Application of the Decree of the VTsIK of the RSFSR ‘On self-sufficiency of the village in grain procurements,’” Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Kirobkom and the Presidium of the OCC (Oblast Control Commission) of the AUCP (b), 2 October 1929.

68 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 370, l. 15b. “About the Preliminary Results of the Grain Procurement Campaign,” bulletin of the Osh Okrispolkom, 12 December 1929 (see also section 2.2.); Ibid., d. 299, l. 320. Resolution of the Third United Plenum of the Osh Okrug Committee and the OKK of the AUCP (b), 18–24 November 1929.

Social and Religious Xenophobia as a Policy Instrument of the Soviet Union—History and Lessons Learned (1929–36): The Case of Southern Kyrgyzstan


70 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 336, l. 9–10.  

71 Ibid., f. 62, op. 1, d. 3, l. 41–42. Memorandum to the Prosecutor of the okrug from the Temporary Assistant Prosecutor of Aravan-Bura Raion Yuldashev, 9 January 1930; Ibid., f. 79, op. 1, d. 12, l. 71–71 ob. Memorandum of the Prosecutor of Aravan-Bura Raion Dzugaev to the NCJ of the KASSR, 9 November 1930; Ibid., l. 156–158; Ibid., l. 60. Report of the deputy head of the Aravan-Bura Raion Administrative Department to the District Executive Committee, 3 December 1930.  

72 CSA of the KR, f. 21, op. 1, d. 24, l. 442–43.  

73 Abdrakhmanov, 44, 136–37, 143.  

74 OOSA, f. 1, d. 338, l. 13. Report on the implementation of measures on selling raw cotton as of 5 March 1930, 6 March 1930. On 1 April 1930, the harvest plan for 1929 had reached 74.74%. In the south of the republic, 23,750 farms had planted cotton on an area of 40,206 hectares against a planned total of 55,611 hectares; Ibid., f. 1, op. 1, d. 338, l. 13, 33.184.  

75 OOSA, f. 79, op. 1, l. 57. Memorandum of Aravan-Bura Raion District Executive Committee to the CEC and CPC of the KASSR. On the issue of giving solid tasks to kulak and prosperous farms, 5 December 1930; Ibid., f. 2, op. 1, d. 45a, l. 14 ob. Report on the work of the Aravan-Bura Raion District Executive Committee for 1929–30, December 1930; CSA of the KR, f. 21, op. 9, d. 106, l. 16. On the socio-economic situation of Aravan-Bura Raion, December 1934; CSA of the KR, f. 33, op. 1, d. 7, l. 40–42. Report on the work of the Control Commission of the AUCP (b) and the Workers-Peasants’ Inspectorate of Aravan-Bura Raion from the Third to the Fourth Party Conference (25 April 1930–10 January 1931); Ibid., l.10–11, 13–14. Report on the work of the Control Commission of the AUCP (b) and the Workers-Peasants’ Inspectorate of Aravan-Bura Raion from the Fourth to the Fifth Party Conference (15 January 1931–1 January 1932).  


The Case of Southern Kyrgyzstan


80 Ibid., f. 611, op. 1, d. 67, l. 37. Information message on the progress of the consideration of cases on grain procurement and the cotton harvest campaign of 1929, 5 March 1930.

81 Ibid., f. 62, op. 1, d. 3, l. 41–42 ob. Memorandum of understanding to the prosecutor of the okrug from the temporary assistant prosecutor of Aravan-Bura Raion Yuldashev, 9 January 1930; Ibid., f. 79c, d.12, l. 156–58. Note from the deputy prosecutor of Aravan-Bura Raion Yuldashev Abubakir about his trip to Aravan, 21 April 1931; Ibid., f. 79c, op. 1, d. 12, l. 71–71 ob. Memorandum of the Prosecutor of Aravan-Bura Raion Dzugaev to the NCJ of the KASSR, 9 November 1930; Ibid., l. 126–55. List of persons convicted by the people’s courts of Aravan-Bura Raion, 7 January 1931.

82 Ibid., l. 43. Circular to all district’s investigators, 30 December 1929.


84 Ibid., d. 231, f. 10–10 ob. Memorandum on the repression of kulak and wealthy households in connection with the sowing campaign of 1932 in southern Kirghizia, 3 June 1931; Ibid., 28–28 ob. Materials for the meeting of the Collegium, 9 June 1932.

85 CSAPD of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 432, l. 105. Report on the work of the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the Kirghiz Republic during the period from 1 January to 1 July 1932. Semi-annual report to the People’s Commissariat of Justice of the RSFSR, 10 July 1932.

86 CSAPD of the KR, p. 10, op. 1, d. 350, l. 49. “On the Intensification of Measures to Clean the Collective Farms from bay-kulak and well-to-do households,” Resolution of the CPC of the Kirghiz SSR, 18 May 1931; Ibid., d. 433, l. 46. Information from the OGPU of the KASSR on the cleaning of collective farms during 1931–32 based on data from 10 raions; Ibid., f. 33, op. 1, d. 7, l. 16. Report on the work of the Control Commission of the AUCP (b) and the WPE (Workers’-Peasants’ Inspectorate) of Aravan-Bura Raion for the period from 15 January 1931 to 1 January 1932; CSA of the KR, f. 21, op. 9, d. 106, l. 34. Characteristics of the socio-economic situation of Aravan-Bura Raion. 1934; U.A. Asanbaev (1968), Sovety Kirgizii v bor’be za stroitel’stvo sotsializma (1929–32 gg) [Soviets of Kirghizia in the struggle to build socialism (1929 –1932)] (Frunze), 139, 307; Istoriya kollektivizatsii sel’skogo khozyaystva v Kirgizii [The History of Collectivization of Agriculture in Kirghizia]. p. 307, From the abstract of the report of the chairman of the Alai-Gulcha District Raisispolkom at the fourth session of the CEC of the KASSR. Not earlier than 20 May 1934.

87 CSAPD of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 421, l. 49. Proposals of the commission on the internal resettlement of kulak farms. A special decision of the Central Asian Bureau of the CC of the AUCP (b), 10 April 1932; Ibid., d. 434, l. 127, Telegram of the SKOS (South Kyrgyz Operational Sector) of the OGPU to the Kirobkom of the AUCP (b), 10 May 1932; D.S. Baktygulov (1978), Sotsialisticheskaya preobrazovaniye kirkizskogo aila (1928–40) [Socialist Transformation of the Kyrgyz Village (1928–1940)] (Frunze, Ilim), 139.

88 CSAPD of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 432, l. 42–94. List of kulak-bay-manap households of Aravan-Bura Raion who were evicted from the territory of the raion and Kirghizia. Protocols No. 1–5 of the meeting of the Political Five at the Aravan-Bura RC of the AUCP (b), 10, 15–17, 20 May 1932.
The Case of Southern Kyrgyzstan

99 Ibid., d. 465, l. 46–47. Service note, 27 August 1931. Most likely these individuals were arrested during the periodic cleansing operations of the SPD (State Political Directorate) in areas of Alai-Gulcha Raion close to the border with China.

90 CSA of the KR, f. 145, op. 1, d. 125, l. 17. Places of detention of the KASSR as of 1 March 1929. Memorandum of the NCJ of the KASSR, 10 April 1929; Ibid., l. 145. Memorandum of the chief of the Frunze Central Correctional Labor House. 2 October 1929.

91 Ibid., d. 125, l. 208. Memorandum to the prosecutor of the Kirghiz Republic, 3 November 1929.

92 Ibid., f. 21c, op. 1, d. 59. On overcrowding in places of detention of the KASSR and measures for reducing prison overcrowding. Resolution of the chamber meeting at the Prosecutor’s Office of the KASSR, 12 March 1931.

93 CSAPD, f. 280, op. 1, d. 51, l. 11. Act on inspection of the Jalal-Abad Detention Center, 10 May 1932; Ibid., f. 10, op. 1, d. 434, l. 108. Extract from the report on the inspection of places of detention in the KASSR, 5 April 1932.

94 CSA of the KR, f. 145, op. 1, d. 231, l. 22 ob. Quarterly report of the NCJ of the KASSR on the management of corrective labour institutions, July 1932.

95 CSA of the KR, f. 145, op. 1, d. 110, l. 19. Information on the number of convicts for bread theft, grain speculation and officials in connection with the procurement of grain for the period from 1 January 1932 to 1 March 1933, April 1933; Ibid., l. 25. Information on the number of criminal cases examined in the Principal Court of the KASSR from 1 January to 1 July 1933, August 1933.

96 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 238, l. 180 ob. Report on the progress of grain procurement in the okrug, 8 September 1929; Ibid., f. 1c, op. 1, d. 298, l. 27. About the political situation in the former Chatkal Voïlost in connection with the emergence of basmachi, November 1929; CSAPD of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 292, l. 91, 108. Operbandsvodka [summary of operations/information on the progress of the fight against gangsters], no. 5, Kyrgyz Department of the OGPU, 26 May 1930.

97 CSA of the KR, f. 21c, op. 1, d. 40, l. 164–164 ob. Information message of the OGPU about the operation carried out on 1–10 November 1930 on the expulsion of participants and accomplices of basmachi, 14 November 1930; Ibid., d. 75, l. 6–6 ob. Certificate of the SKOS of the OGPU on the results of combat operations to eliminate banditry in southern Kirghizia in 1932, January 1933.

98 Baktygulov (1978), 132; CSA of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 285, l. 134. Service note to the acting secretary of the Kirovkom of the AUCP (b) Morin from the authorized representative in Osh Okrug Baishv, June 1930; Ibid., d. 508, l. 2; Ibid., f. 10, op. 1, d. 512, l. 129. Summary of the report of the Oblast Committee of the AUCP (b) at raion party conferences held by 20 December 1933; CSA of the KR, f. 21c, op. 1, d. 38, l. 5. On measures taken to intercept citizens fleeing from Kichik Alai of Naukat Raion. Resolution of the Executive Bureau of the Osh Okrug Committee of the AUCP (b), 13 July 1930; Ibid., l. 195 ob. Special report on the political and economic situation along the border strip of Central Asia. PR of the OGPU in Central Asia, 11 December 1932; Ibid., d. 89, l. 184. Information about cases of escaping from a permanent place of residence. The OGPU of the KASSR, 7 July 1933; Ibid., d. 506, l. 50–51. Memorandum to the secretary of the Central Asian Bureau of the CC of the AUCP (b) Bauman, 20 August 1933; Ibid., l. 62. Address of the deputy chair of the Murghab Raion Executive Committee of Gorno-Badakhshan Oblast of the Tajik ASSR Bolekbaev to chair of the CPC of the KASSR B. Isakeev, April 1935.

100 Dzhunushaliev (1993), 221.

101 Abdrakhmanov, 140, 143, 150.


103 CSAPD of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 269, l. 184. Telegram of the Kirborkom to the Central Asian Bureau of the CC of the AUCP (b). On the reasons for the reduction in the number of livestock in the republic, 20 December 1930; CSA of the KR, f. 21c, op. 1, d. 112, l. 3. Telegram response of the secretary of the Kirborkom of the AUCP (b) Isakeev to the CC of the AUCP (b), 1934.

104 OOSA, f. 1, op. 1, d. 350, l. 9–10. Information about the situation in Alai-Gulcha and Bazar-Kurgan raions. Protocol No. 1 of the Basmachi meeting of Osh Okrug, 27 May 1930; Ibid., d. 298, l. 16–17. On the political situation in the former Chatkal Volost in connection with the emergence of basmachi, November 1929; Ibid., f. 79, op. 1, d. 14, l. 64. About the political state of Sulukta Raion. Letter of the secretary of the RC of the AUCP (b) to the Kirborkom of the AUCP (b), 12 June 1931; Ibid., p. 57 ob–58, Communication of the secretary of the Sulukta RC of the AUCP (b) to the SKOS of the OGPU about the events in connection with the stirring up of Basmachi in the raion, 7 June 1931; CSA of the KR, f. 21c, op. 1, d. 58, l. 153–54, Special report of the SKOS of the OGPU on covering the course of the spring sowing campaign in the raions of southern Kirghizia, 25 April 1931; CSA of the KR, f. 21c, op. 1, d. 35, l. 71–72. On the work of the government commission of the Kirghiz CEC in the south of Kirghizia. Materials for a report, November 1930; Ibid., d. 231, l. 10–10 ob. Memorandum of the NCJ on the repression of kulak-wealthy farms in connection with the spring sowing campaign of 1932 in southern Kirghizia, June 1930; CSAPD of the KR, f. 10, op. 1, d. 285, f. 158–59. Circular of the Osh Raion Committee of the AUCP (b) to the Kirborkom of the CPSU (b) and the Central Asian Bureau of the CC of the AUCP (b), 15 July 1930; Ibid., f. 280, op. 1, d. 3, l. 26. About early village councils elections. Resolution of the Executive Committee of Jalal-Abad RC of the AUCP (b), 7 October 1930; Ibid., d. 16, f. 5 ob.–6–6, ob.–7. About painful phenomena in the party organization and the fight against them. Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Jalal-Abad RC of the AUCP (b). December 1932; Ibid., f. 363, op. 1, d. 2, l. 7, 65–67. Minutes of the meetings of the Board of the Control Commission of Bazaar-Kurgan Raion dated 16 January and 11 December 1933; Ibid., d. 292, f. 91. Osh Okrug. Operbandsvodka of the OGPU of the KASSR, 23 May 1930.
105 List of settlements and polling stations in Osh Oblast (2009), brochure (Osh), 2–87.


AUTHOR

Myktar Tagaev is the Director of the Center for Historical and Cultural Studies, a non-governmental organization, in Osh, Kyrgyzstan.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Centre gratefully acknowledges the members of the project’s international advisory committee: Gulnara Aitpaeva (Aigine Cultural Research Center, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan), Morgan Liu (Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, USA), Benjamin Loring (Victor Pinchuk Foundation, Kiev, Ukraine) and Jeff Sahadeo (Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada).

Founded in Ottawa by His Highness the Aga Khan in partnership with the Government of Canada, the Global Centre for Pluralism is an international research and education centre. Inspired by Canada’s experience as a diverse and inclusive country, the Centre was created to understand the dynamics of pluralism and to advance positive responses to the challenge of living peacefully and productively together in diverse societies. Pluralism is defined as a positive response to diversity, grounded in mutual respect.