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International Development, Sustainable Development Goals and Pluralism

Elisabeth King | New York University

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper, commissioned by the Global Centre for Pluralism, examines the relationship between pluralism and international development.¹ The Global Centre for Pluralism views diversity as an objective fact, in contrast to pluralism, which is a normative response that values diversity. Proceeding through three core sections, this paper: synthesizes scholarly evidence in regards to the roles of diversity and pluralism in development; considers how international development actors approach diversity, pluralism and development; and examines global attention to pluralism in key areas of international development. How the international development community engages with diversity, and then pluralism, is integral to understanding if, and how, the Global Centre for Pluralism and development actors may choose to practice pluralism.

The first section focuses on scholarly research and the evidence for diversity either hindering or bolstering development. Much empirical research shows that diversity can, and often does, hinder development. Two families of mechanisms may mediate the relationship between diversity and development. The first set relates to the likelihood that development preferences may not be shared in diverse communities, that people in diverse communities may poorly function together to provide public goods, and/or that people in diverse communities may be less able to sanction each other for failing to cooperate than co-ethnics. The second set refers to the increased possibility of violent conflict as a result of mismanaged diversity. Here, horizontal inequalities—inequalities between groups—and ethnic fractionalization contribute to a potential vicious cycle of underdevelopment and conflict. However, this section of the paper also shows that such challenges for development are not a necessary product of diversity, nor are they

This paper is part of a new publication series from the Global Centre for Pluralism titled **Intersections: Practicing Pluralism**. Designed for practitioners, each paper maps an established field of practice or perspective on diversity, examining its conceptual foundations and applications to identify potential intersections with pluralism. By helping practitioners apply a pluralism lens to their work and by showing how many fields of practice already contribute to pluralism, our aim is to open a new global conversation about living peacefully with diversity.

an essential characteristic of human relationships. Diversity can bring benefits for development by providing a diversity of viewpoints. Diversity has been argued to bolster development when the gross benefits outweigh the costs. Importantly, the belief in the promise of diversity is said to be a necessary, but insufficient, precondition for realizing the benefits of diversity.

The second section provides an overview of the approaches of international development actors in addressing diversity and pluralism, and presents a pluralism and development continuum. This section discusses where international development actors fall on the continuum, with three broad ideal types. First, some development actors are “diversity-disregarding,” arguing that taking diversity into account is unnecessary and even potentially harmful to overall development. These actors argue for symmetric treatment of all groups without differentiation. Second, some development actors are deemed “minimalist,” arguing that it is important to take diversity into account, particularly marginalized groups, in order to address inequalities in development and to avoid conflict. Third, and consistent with the Global Centre for Pluralism’s approach, “maximalist” development actors argue that diversity is instrumentally important for development and/or that pluralism—respect for diversity—is an inherent part of development itself. Most development actors today are minimalist (accommodating diversity) as opposed to maximalist (promoting pluralism), although a minority recognizes pluralism as an inherent part of development.

The third section assesses the level of attention to pluralism in three influential international development areas, offering insights into possible openings for the Global Centre for Pluralism and other practitioners with an interest in pluralism. First, an analysis of the past 15 *World Development Reports* shows that while diversity and inequality are fairly commonly addressed, “pluralism” is much less frequently used. Second, an examination of measures and indexes of development illustrates that pluralism is not currently measured. Finally, a systematic coding of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and their sub-goals show that while most goals are consistent with a minimalist position, several goals are explicitly maximalist.

This paper closes with three recommendations for the Global Centre for Pluralism and others interested in pluralism and development today. The Global Centre for Pluralism, and development practitioners and scholars, could usefully work towards broadening the evidence base in regards to the effects of pluralism-based development interventions. They could also play a role in raising awareness of the importance of diversity and helping to get, and then keep, issues of diversity and pluralism on the global agenda. The SDGs present a particularly salient opportunity. Finally, given that pluralism is overlooked by existing measures of development, there is an opening for the creation and use of a pluralism index or assessment tool that could make an important contribution to global knowledge and practice.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Global Centre for Pluralism has commissioned a group of studies to examine how pluralism relates to key international challenges and priorities, such as building peace, human rights and social cohesion. In that spirit, this paper focuses on pluralism and international development. Such an investigation is well warranted. In its drivers of pluralism framework, the Global Centre for Pluralism includes “livelihoods and wellbeing” as a key dimension, as well as a number of other factors that may intersect with development. The Global Centre for Pluralism is interested in understanding if and how the application of a pluralism lens can contribute, or add value, to development practice. In order to do so, there are number of pressing questions and debates that must first be addressed. How does the presence of social diversity affect development? What are the various approaches of international development actors to the presence of diversity? What is the general level of attention to pluralism among key development actors, including if and how the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) engage with pluralism?

Prior to engaging with these questions, the first section of the paper lays out key concepts. The paper then shows that, while there is a great deal of evidence that diversity is related to lower levels of development, this is not always the case and certainly need not be so. It next maps the approaches of international development actors from “diversity-disregarding developmentalists,” to “minimalists” (most international development actors today) who want to minimize or overcome the potentially harmful effects of diversity on

development, to “maximalists” who embrace pluralism as a positive approach for development. Finally, by examining the *World Development Reports*, the Human Development Index and the SDGs, the paper shows generally low levels of attention to pluralism, albeit with some important recent commitments. The paper concludes with some practical suggestions of how the Global Centre for Pluralism and international development practitioners might contribute to “chang[ing] the global conversation about diversity” in the field of international development.²

Concepts

Before proceeding, it is useful to define the central terms. I borrow the Global Centre for Pluralism’s working definition of pluralism as “a set of intentions and practices that seek to institutionalize recognition of difference and respect for diversity as civic culture.”³ The Global Centre for Pluralism makes clear that pluralism is a “process, not a product.”⁴ The Global Centre for Pluralism views diversity as an objective fact, in contrast to pluralism, which is a normative response to diversity. While there are multiple forms of difference that could be included, in this paper, I focus principally on ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, especially at the sub-national level. While diversity does not equate with pluralism, recognition of diversity is a necessary precursor to pluralism.

It is more difficult to pin down a working definition of development. As the coming pages will show, how one thinks about diversity and pluralism may affect one’s very definition of development. The

narrowest, but also most historically prominent, view of development equates it with economic growth, most appropriately measured by GDP per capita or similar national-level indicators. Perhaps the most expansive definition, and one that has become a central part of the now more common “human development” approach comes from Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen who writes that, “[d]evelopment can be seen... as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Focusing on human freedoms contrasts with narrower views of development, such as identifying development with the growth of gross national product, or with the rise in personal incomes, or with industrialization, or with technological advance, or with social modernization.”⁵ The current development focus on empowerment also speaks to development as the expansion of the capacity of individuals to make choices.⁶ The measure most commonly associated with this form of development is the Human Development Index, rating the quality of life in different countries with measures of life expectancy, education and per capita income.⁷

Writing about international development, I focus on efforts to improve development in nations around the world, acknowledging that most such efforts are concentrated in and towards the Global South. International development actors include a broad array of donors, policy-makers and practitioners from the United Nations and the World Bank, to national development organizations, to local, national and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO). In reflecting on the approaches and practices of big actors in the field of international development, I focus especially on the United Nations, the United Nations Development

Program (UNDP) and the World Bank. I pay particular attention to the Sustainable Development Goals, the set of 17 goals and many more specific targets, adopted by world leaders in September 2015 to “end poverty, protect the planet, and ensure prosperity for all” over the next 15 years.⁸

II. DIVERSITY AND DEVELOPMENT

Drawing on the state of scholarly research, this section shows that there is much evidence that diversity can, and often does, hinder development. As Habyarimana et al. write, “this argument runs against the grain of the growing embrace of multiculturalism. Yet, as uncomfortable as it may be, a large body of evidence based on studies conducted in communities around the globe backs up to claim that ethnic diversity often impedes the provision of public goods.”⁹ However, this section also shows that such challenges for development are not a necessary product of diversity, nor are they an essential characteristic of human relationships. There are specific circumstances and channels through which social diversity hinders development. Likewise, there are a number of ways in which diversity may promote development. This relationship, too, is not certain and materializes only under certain conditions.

Social Diversity May Hinder Development

There are a number of ways in which social diversity may hinder development. This section explores two

principal mechanisms: (i) preferences, technology mechanisms and benefits of co-ethnic sanctioning that may limit the provision of public goods in ethnically-diverse societies; and (ii) violent conflict, known as “development in reverse,”¹⁰ which may be more likely in diverse societies where there are important horizontal inequalities between groups.

Preferences, technology mechanisms and the benefits of co-ethnic sanctioning

It is a widely supported finding across multiple academic studies that there is a negative relationship between diversity (and especially ethnic heterogeneity) and public goods provision—education, irrigation projects, trash collection, roads and the like—at the community-level. Abhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan refer to this relationship as “one of the most powerful hypotheses in political economy.”¹¹ Public goods provision is instrumentally important for economic development and also the fulfillment of human development.

Habyarimana et al. review the evidence in the opening chapter of their book, *Coethnicity: Diversity and Dilemmas of Collective Action* (2009), illustrating how evidence comes from multiple sectors and examples from all corners of the globe. I draw heavily on their work in this section. In a study on education in Kenya, for instance, Edward Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty find that ethnically heterogeneous communities contribute 20% less in school contributions per student than homogenous communities.¹² In Pakistan, Asim Khwaja finds that in a community development project, more heterogeneous

communities perform substantially worse on project upkeep than less diverse communities.¹³ In Nepal, Baland et al. show that diverse communities engage in less collective action on forestry projects.¹⁴ In Mexico, Jeff Dayton-Johnson finds that community-level irrigation projects are less successful in socially diverse communities.¹⁵ At a higher level, William Easterly and Ross Levine find that slower economic growth in African countries is associated with greater ethnic diversity.¹⁶ Similar trends extend to more developed countries. S. Xin Li finds that in Europe, individuals’ motivations to pay taxes are lower in more ethnically fragmented societies than in more homogeneous ones.¹⁷ Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir and William Easterly formally test the relationship between social diversity and low public goods provision, and find strong support using data from urban United States.¹⁸

Habyarimana et al. explain that these statistical relationships “provide evidence of correlation [in these specific cases] rather than a deterministic causal relation.”¹⁹ The big question, they argue, is to ask why these relationships exist or, in other words, to identify the specific mechanisms through which diversity leads to the under-provision of public goods. They posit three families of possibilities, each having some empirical backing from a larger body of literature.²⁰ The first possible mechanism is preference diversity. That is, people with different identity backgrounds may have different preferences as to what they would like to do.²¹ People who share the same ethnicity, co-ethnics, may be more likely to take each other’s welfare into account or co-ethnics may prefer to work together more than with people from different ethnic groups. A second possibility relates to what Habyarimana et al. call “technology

mechanisms.” These mechanisms refer to the possibility that co-ethnics may be able to function together more efficiently, perhaps because they can better read one another’s characteristics or signals, they may engage with each other more frequently than those from other ethnic groups, and they may better be able to track down one another. Third, and finally, co-ethnics may be more likely to punish one another for failure to cooperate than people across different ethnic groups.

In their own study, Habyarimana et al. use innovative experimental games in a laboratory setting in Uganda to try to identify the mechanisms that matter the most. In their particular context, they found no evidence of preference mechanisms. Instead, they found support for the various technology mechanisms and the reciprocity hypothesis. In their words, problems of public goods provision in ethnically diverse communities in Uganda is “not because of biases toward in-group members, but because they expect co-ethnics to cooperate with them and because they believe that, should they fail to cooperate, they might be punished.”²²

The Habyarimana et al. study is especially important for making two salient points about the challenges of ethnic diversity for development. First, the mechanisms that link ethnic diversity to such challenges (i.e., cooperation and public goods provision) are likely to differ from one country or even community to the next. Second, understanding the specific mechanisms is crucial for designing successful development policies and programs.²³ If development problems arise because preferences are not shared across different ethnic groups,

for example, this warrants a different kind of development effort than if such challenges arise due to increased ability to sanction members of one’s own ethnic group.

More recently, a second wave of scholarship adds nuance to this body of literature and further shows that there is no mechanical relationship between diversity and public goods. R.M. Gisselquist, for instance, re-analyzes one of the most widely-cited articles in the diversity and public goods field,²⁴ and shows that ethnic diversity is related to poorer provision of some types of public goods, but stronger provision of others, adding that “[i]n most cases, there is no clear relationship.”²⁵ In a recent study in Sierra Leone, Rachel Glennerster, Edward Miguel and Alexander Rothenberg find that diversity at the local level is not associated with lower public goods provision.²⁶ They investigate the role of historical and institutional factors, and posit that the promotion of national identity, especially through language, may best explain inter-ethnic cooperation in Sierra Leone, not third-party enforcement as in the Habyarimana et al. study.

In fact, there are also a set of studies that begin to examine context-specific policies that might address the issue of diversity and public goods provision. For example, Edward Miguel studies public goods provision in similar areas on each side of the Tanzanian–Kenyan border.²⁷ He finds that contributions to schooling on the Tanzanian side, under a nation-building strategy, are nearly identical in more and less homogeneous communities, whereas in Kenya, where policies have exacerbated ethnic divisions, communities at mean levels of ethnic diversity contribute 25%

less per pupil than homogenous areas. In Sierra Leone, though, while Glennerster et al. also propose the importance of national identity in explaining the lack of relationship between ethnicity and low public goods provision, the approach involved especially shared language and did not include dismantling chieftancies as in Tanzania.²⁸ In short, there are a number of context-specific factors, or strategies, that may moderate the often-fraught relationship between diversity and development. Helping to build the evidence base on such possible factors is one potential contribution for the Global Centre for Pluralism and for practitioners open to partnering with researchers. One question for the Global Centre for Pluralism will be whether or not these moderating factors are in line with a pluralist agenda.

Violent conflict

Next, if diversity makes conflict more likely, this is another mechanism by which social diversity may hinder development. Indeed, war has come to be widely understood as “development in reverse.”²⁹ Economically, the average cost of an intra-state conflict is reported to total more than 30 years of GDP growth for a medium-sized developing country.³⁰ Over the course of the Sierra Leonean war, as just one example, per capita income declined by 50%.³¹ Further, the costs of conflict are uneven between individuals and groups. There are also, of course, grave social costs.

While some authors contend that cultural difference itself is conducive to war,³² or that the specifics of ethnic demography make violent conflict more likely,³³ diversity need not, and often does not, lead

to conflict. There are however several pathways through which it may do so, ultimately resulting in “development in reverse.”

First, “horizontal inequalities”—the important social, political and/or economic inequalities between groups³⁴—can mediate the relationship between diversity and development. Poor management of diversity can lead to horizontal inequalities, such inequalities can contribute to conflict, and conflict then leads to important economic and social costs that are negative for development understood both in a narrow economic sense and more broadly in human development. A number of recent quantitative studies show that violent conflict is more likely where there are important political, economic or social inequalities between ethnic groups.³⁵ Ethnic inequalities are particularly important in sub-Saharan Africa and found to be a more significant predictor of conflict risk than religiously based inequalities.³⁶

Horizontal inequalities are common. Take, for example, Canada. In the UN’s most recent Human Development Index (HDI), Canada ranked eighth. This ranking, though, masks important horizontal inequalities. If only data from indigenous groups were to be used, this ranking would fall to 63rd.³⁷ The HDI produces a misleading image of human development since a country’s rank reflects an average. In the Philippines, for example, the national capital region had a top HDI value of 0.871, placing it next to Trinidad and Tobago on the global list. Western Mindanao, one of only two Filipino island groupings with a significant Muslim population, and also a conflict-affected area, ranked just 0.410, side-by-side with Zambia.³⁸

The second pathway builds on the mechanisms discussed above that link diversity (and especially ethnic fractionalization) to low levels of development. Ethnic fractionalization can undermine development, low levels of development are strongly related to the likelihood of conflict, and conflict can in turn further retard development.³⁹ “Underdevelopment” is widely understood “as dangerous and destabilizing,” and security and “underdevelopment” are considered a “vicious circle.”⁴⁰ There are clear links between the various components in which the Global Centre for Pluralism is interested—peace-building, social cohesion and development, for instance—that could usefully be brought together to build upon the pluralism framework and to think about future field interventions and studies.

Social Diversity May Bolster Development

On the other hand, while less empirical evidence exists, a case can certainly be made that social diversity can bolster development. In his book, *Common Ground* (2014), Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau makes the case that Canada’s great diversity has resulted in harmony and development, and that this is the way forward for the country as well. While the country is far from perfect (as the discussion of horizontal inequalities above suggests), Trudeau argues that “[w]e have always built prosperity by coming together, learning from each other’s distinct perspectives, but moving beyond those differences to find common ground. This is how we have worked toward a just and prosperous country.”⁴¹

Offering a “logic of diversity,” author Scott Page makes a similar argument in his book *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies* (2007).

In contrast to the studies discussed in the above section that are based largely on within-country and cross-national empirical evidence, most of Page’s evidence, as a mathematician and social scientist, comes from problem solving exercises and mathematical models. His central argument as it relates to development is that “identity diversity does [consistently] create benefits—[albeit] not every time, not in every context.”⁴² Similar to Trudeau’s reference to distinct perspectives, Page’s principal mechanism is the power of “cognitive diversity” (diversity of viewpoints). While Page does not equate identity with cognitive diversity, he argues that cognitive diversity is a product of two direct causes, training and experiences, and one indirect cause, identity.⁴³ Page contends that “[a]ttributes such as race shape our experiences. They limit, steer, and even guide our choices... [and] cause us to construct different sets of cognitive tools;” they give people “different wells of experience upon which to draw.”⁴⁴

Page’s work supports the “value in diversity hypothesis”⁴⁵ that “well-managed diversity does produce benefits.”⁴⁶ While he acknowledges that one can easily point to many examples of diverse societies that have encountered challenges in development, Page claims that these cases should not be generalized too far since many wealthy, democratic countries function and grow economically very well with diversity. The 2004 *Human Development Report* makes a similar argument, praising the value of the “dynamics and

creativity arising from the interactions of different cultural groups.”⁴⁷ The report references a study showing that 11 of the top 15 high-technology metropolitan areas in the United States are also those with the highest overall diversity, inferring that diversity fosters creativity and innovation.⁴⁸ It also points to the economic benefits of migration wherein recipient countries increase diversity in the hopes of economic gain.⁴⁹

Of course, the benefits of social diversity are not incontrovertible, and the above section on the ways in which social diversity may hinder development points to important challenges. Page posits that the net benefit of diversity is equal to the gross benefits of diverse tools minus the costs of diversity, such as the mechanisms discussed in the previous section. Overall, he summarizes his argument saying, “[w]e should not expect to see study after study showing unequivocal benefits from diversity. So for the moment, it’s okay to look for evidence that diverse groups *can* perform better than more homogenous groups. What would concern us would be evidence that diverse groups never, or only rarely, do better than more homogenous groups.”⁵⁰

Importantly for the Global Centre for Pluralism, Page draws on studies from business management to make the case that belief in the promise of diversity is a necessary, but insufficient, precondition for reaping the benefits of identity diversity.⁵¹ As D.A. Thomas and Robin Ely put it, “[w]e’re not likely to listen to what others have to say if we don’t think it will help.”⁵² Given the Global Centre for Pluralism’s mandate, promoting belief in the value of diversity among development policy-makers and practitioners may be one important avenue of contribution.

III. APPROACHES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACTORS TO THE PRESENCE OF DIVERSITY

In order to understand the current relationship between pluralism and development, it is also important to examine the approaches of international development actors to the presence of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity. The main international development actors have approached diversity in a number of different ways. We can think about these as stretching along a continuum. This continuum builds off of, and in some ways parallels, an earlier continuum on international development approaches to governing ethnic diversity in conflict-affected contexts.⁵³ This earlier continuum divided development actors into three broad camps: (i) ethnicity-blind developmentalists who believe that “development aid naturally promotes peace;” (ii) ethnicity-conscious minimalists, who work on the idea that “development aid can contribute to ethnic conflict and thus actions must be taken to mitigate these effects;” and (iii) ethnicity-conscious maximalists, who believe that “development aid can promote peace with appropriate programme design” and should be a focus of transformative development strategies.⁵⁴ This work highlighted that each position is an ideal type, and that specific development actors often simultaneously hold positions and programs that are consistent with different spots on the continuum.

Borrowing from, and building upon, this earlier work and moving to a pluralism and development continuum with the same caveats, there are again three broad ideal types of development actors. Their viewpoints summarize how they think about social diversity (diversity as hindrance vs. bolster of development, as per section II), and how this informs their strategies and programming for diversity and for development. This continuum is illustrated in Figure 1. First, on one end, there are “diversity-disregarding” development approaches based on a belief that focusing on social diversity is either unnecessary or even harmful to development. Within these approaches, individuals and groups are treated symmetrically and assimilation is often a goal, or at least a consequence. Second, in the middle, there are development approaches that view accommodating social diversity as instrumentally important. Perhaps deemed “minimalist,” these

approaches typically focus on minimizing the possible harmful consequences of social diversity on economic development and/or human development. Approaches are likelier to focus on asymmetric treatment with an aspiration of equality of access and/or similarity in outcomes. Finally, at the other end of the continuum lie “maximalist” approaches wherein respect for diversity, or in the Global Centre for Pluralism’s terms pluralism, is either instrumentally or inherently important to development. These approaches too are also likely to entail asymmetric treatment and accommodation but further with a clear value attributed to pluralism. The sections below present additional detail on each of the three overarching camps. Overall, it appears that most development actors and programming today fall into the middle ground position.

Figure 1: Pluralism and Development Continuum

Continuum	Views on social diversity and development	Likely strategy for diversity	Likely strategies for development
Diversity-disregarding developmentalists	Unnecessary or even harmful to focus on social diversity as social diversity has harmful consequences	Disregarding; often assimilation	Symmetric treatment
Minimalists	Addressing social diversity is instrumentally important to overcome possible harmful consequences of diversity	Accommodation	Asymmetric treatment toward equality of access or similarity of outcomes
Maximalists	Promoting social diversity is good for development instrumentally and/or inherently	Accommodation	Asymmetric treatment toward advancing development and pluralism

Diversity-Disregarding Developmentalists

Classical modernization theorists, perhaps the first diversity-disregarding developmentalists, believed that ethnic or cultural diversity could be disregarded, as it would become irrelevant as societies modernized. They argued that through increased contact with different groups as a result of modernization, particularly with reference to ethnic groups, within-country differences would diminish or even be eliminated. For example, Walker Connor argued that increased access to communication technology and better transportation networks would promote intergroup linkages which would then result in a convergence of group identification and reduction of difference.⁵⁵ Thus, classical modernization is viewed as a transformative process that reduces the salience of group (cultural, ethnic, racial, religious) identification in favour of the individual achievements and status according to modern (Western) ideals.⁵⁶ The result of the classically linear modernization process is such that ethnic and cultural groups become “remnants of tradition, declining as cultural rationality and integration increased.”⁵⁷ Overall, traditional modernization theory takes on an assimilationist approach to diversity.

More recent difference-disregarding developmentalists typically acknowledge the ongoing importance of social difference, but feel that focusing on it is too dangerous. For example, some policy-makers and scholars warn that focusing on ethnicity risks entrenching and essentializing it, which may result in conflict. S.G. Simonsen argues that the way in which the international community has engaged in institution-building in Afghanistan,

Bosnia, Iraq and Kosovo has presumed static and unchanging ethnic identities that has, in his estimation, hindered peace-building.⁵⁸ He contends, for instance, that ethnic institutions in Bosnia that aim to balance power between Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs have upheld ethnic boundaries such that little cross-ethnic voting occurs. Florian Bieber further argues that the institutional set-up in Bosnia has actually discouraged cooperation across ethnic lines.⁵⁹ The potential risks of focusing on ethnicity raise a “dilemma of recognition.”⁶⁰

Second, others consider whether ethnicity may simply be too politically sensitive to address.⁶¹ Typically taking the state as the level of analysis, they may worry about meddling in the internal affairs of sovereign states. In Rwanda today, for instance, under a government that has outlawed ethnicity in the public sphere and adopted an assimilationist “we are all Rwandan” approach, the international development community works with “willful ignorance” of the ethnic dynamics that persist in the post-genocide period.⁶²

Finally, other development actors work with an understanding that the same approaches to development assistance work everywhere, regardless of the ethnic or even conflict dynamics on the ground,⁶³ albeit without a clear assimilationist approach. There has long been a belief that the benefits of development “trickle-down.” As Ronald J. Herring and Milton J. Esman put it, “the dominant worldview of international development organisations has been that technically correct policies produce macro-economic results that are desired by and eventually benefit all citizens of all countries.”⁶⁴ Asymmetric approaches are thought

to “intrude on the apparent technical rationality of development policy.”⁶⁵ Indeed, for development actors with a “diversity-disregarding” approach, individuals and groups are typically treated symmetrically without overt differentiation between them.

Minimalists

Whereas the most entrenched diversity-disregarding developmentalists believe that diversity will disappear with development, minimalists and maximalists believe that diversity is here to stay.⁶⁶ From the view of minimalists, the consequences of such diversity and how they interact with development programs, projects and targets must thus be addressed. They may aspire to equality of access and/or similarity in outcomes. Overall, it appears that most international development actors today engage in minimalist approaches to diversity.

Inequalities between diverse groups are thought to hinder the human development of those groups and may hinder broader economic development as well.⁶⁷ The 2006 *World Development Report* concentrated on equity and development, and makes the case that “the pursuit of sustainable, long-term prosperity is inseparable from a broadening of economic opportunities and political voice to most or all of society.”⁶⁸ In a context where diversity translates into inequality, the report recognizes that there may be short-term trade-offs between equity and efficiency.⁶⁹ As a 2010 UNDP report put it, “overcoming the marginalisation of minorities has direct benefits for national development processes and the achievement of inclusive growth.”⁷⁰

In the same way that “gender neutral” development policies have been recognized to be inadequate and that gender-specific programming became a focus on large development actors,⁷¹ symmetric treatment for all may overlook the ways in which social diversity can hinder access and outcomes. Indeed, it has become important to many international development actors to focus specifically on marginalized groups so that they do not lag behind in development as compared to other groups. In post-apartheid South Africa, for example, opening school doors to all students has been a key goal for governments working for development and peace-building actors. Yet, achieving a sense of horizontal equity by desegregating schools is very difficult. In South Africa, since educational inequality was so high, merely equalizing the playing field at the point of entry is likely to be inadequate. As scholar Pam Christie writes, “Leaving peace, equity, and justice to chance . . . inevitably opened possibilities of not only continuing existing inequalities but also of increasing them.”⁷² In the Philippines, the countrywide KALAHI-CIDSS community-driven development program puts a special focus on involving indigenous persons as they are more likely to be excluded in development programs, even those ostensibly targeted at the whole community.⁷³

The importance among international development actors attributed to focusing on inequalities between groups is also clear in the growing focus on inequality in the measurement of development. A long-recognized limitation of the Human Development Index is that it is an aggregated national-level measure, likely hiding inequalities within countries.⁷⁴ Earlier annual *Human Development Reports (HDR)*—the UNDP’s annual state of development publications that include the

HDI rankings—disaggregated the HDI by income class, gender, ethnic group and geographical region for a limited number of countries.⁷⁵ And, the possibility has always been open, if countries have the appropriate data, that HDI be disaggregated along lines of gender, regional or social diversity.⁷⁶ More recently, the HDI has also made more systematic efforts to acknowledge potential inequalities hidden by aggregated measures. The 2010 *HDR* was the first to systematically include an “Inequality-adjusted” Human Development Index (IHDI) to examine development within countries, not just between them. Measuring and acknowledging such inequalities led to some important movement in the rankings. And, there is important messaging in the idea that more unequal countries are considered to be less developed. There is also now a Gender Development Index. But, for those most interested in pluralism, the IHDI focuses on inequalities between individuals rather than identity groups. There are possibilities, depending on data, to disaggregate by identity groups, but this is not systematically publicly available.

The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) also appeared in the *HDR* for the first time in 2010. It provides several measures of health, education and standard of living measured in more nuanced ways than earlier efforts (e.g., looking at standard of living as measures of cooking fuel, toilet, water, electricity, floor and assets at the household level). It also identifies the number of people who are “multi-dimensionally” poor, experiencing deprivation in at least one third of measures in each of the three main categories. The MPI can be disaggregated by region, ethnicity and more⁷⁷ enriching understanding of development and

social diversity, and, in this regard, especially inequality. It is becoming, and anticipated to become further, an important tool of international development practitioners and policy makers.⁷⁸ These moves towards more complex measures and data that can be disaggregated show increased concern for inequality within and between socially diverse groups, as well as possibilities for further understanding and addressing such inequality. As a recent Overseas Development Institute report put forth, “the... adoption of the SDGs offers a pivotal opportunity to bring group-based inequalities, and the associated data requirements, into relief at an international level. The MDGs were, for the most part, set at a highly aggregate level. It is absolutely crucial that the new set of ambitions are monitored at a more disaggregated level, with success defined by improvements across all groups.”⁷⁹

Another concern for minimalists is to avoid conflict along identity lines.⁸⁰ As Peter Uvin puts it, “ethnicity and political amnesia does not make development aid and the process it sets in motion apolitical; it just renders these processes invisible.”⁸¹ In this respect, one goal is to avoid creating or promoting the horizontal inequalities that may underlie conflict. Where groups have fewer significant political, economic or social inequalities, conflict is less likely. Introducing new resources via international development efforts inevitably opens possibilities for inequality, competition and conflict. If, for instance, development aid is targeted at some groups rather than others, it may foster conflict-conducive horizontal inequalities, or, in conflict-affected societies prompt “distributional effects” that may reinforce conflict. When I worked on the landmine issue with an NGO committed to helping

rid the world of these weapons, important security and developmental concerns, the organization's first project was to clear a minefield in Bosnia. My colleagues recounted community members complaining that they cleared a Serb village first, possibly raising intergroup tensions. To minimize such situations, international development actors can implement conflict-sensitive monitoring and impact assessments that include a focus on diverse social groups before, during and after development projects and programs. In a project I visited in the Kenyan Rift Valley, for example, a Canadian NGO was engaged in community development including building schools, digging wells, micro-lending, and promoting improved agricultural and health practices. Since the project headquarters were rather arbitrarily situated near two territorially distinct, and often antagonistic, ethnic communities, project managers decided to engage in the same projects in each community at roughly the same time to foster interethnic fairness. According to some, even if development agencies are not often explicit in addressing ethnic (or other forms of) diversity, politicians, civil servants, international development actors and others do carefully think about such challenges.⁸²

Maximalists: Pluralism is Important to Development

It is difficult to find examples of mainstream international actors who think that not only accommodating diversity, but promoting respect for diversity (pluralism), is instrumentally important for development. Several potential instrumental values of pluralism for development were, however,

discussed in the paper's first, more theoretical, section. There is, nonetheless, convergence in the international development community around the idea of human development, wherein valuing diverse cultural identities is an inherent part.

The 2004 Human Development Report, *Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, makes the case strongly and clearly:

If the world is to reach the Millennium Development Goals and ultimately eradicate poverty, it must first successfully confront the challenge of how to build inclusive, culturally diverse societies. Not just because doing so successfully is a precondition for countries to focus properly on other priorities of economic growth, health and education for all citizens. But because allowing people full cultural expression is an important development end in itself.⁸³

The report goes on to say that “[c]ultural liberty is a vital part of human development because being able to choose one's identity—who one is—without losing the respect of others or being excluded from other choices is important in leading a full life.”⁸⁴ It emphasizes “cultural liberty is a human right and an important aspect of human development—and thus worthy of state action and attention.”⁸⁵ As further discussed below, at least two of the Sustainable Development sub-goals are consistent with this maximalist approach.

The Global Centre for Pluralism approach falls into this maximalist camp recognizing the inherent value of diversity and seeking to explore the instrumental value of a pluralism approach. It

may usefully support a broadening of the evidence base in regards to the possible instrumental value of a pluralism approach. Practitioners may also find benefit in reflecting upon where they situate themselves on this pluralism and development continuum and why.

IV. ATTENTION TO PLURALISM

Having discovered that most development actors' positions are more minimalist (accommodating diversity) as opposed to maximalist (promoting pluralism), this third section hones in on attention to pluralism (or lack thereof) in three influential international development areas. This section of the paper first examines the *World Development Reports* across time, then considers the measurement of development itself and, finally surveys the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). By focusing on these three areas, it also illuminates specific possibilities for intervention by the Global Centre for Pluralism and development actors committed to promoting pluralism.


World Development Reports

In order to examine the degree of attention to diversity and pluralism among at least one of the main international development actors, the World Bank, my research assistants (RAs) undertook an original coding of the annual *World Development Reports* (WDR) from 2001–16 coinciding with the period of the Millennium Development Goals. As

described by the World Bank, the *WDR* provides up-to-date information on the “economic, social, and environmental state of the world today” and each year focuses on a specific aspect of development.⁸⁶ It has become an influential report in development circles. Taking each complete document, the RAs searched for the inclusion of each of the following concepts: diversity, pluralism, and equality.⁸⁷ By examining the context in which the term was used, the RAs removed all “false positives.” For instance, they removed a reference to “diversifying household activities,” which emerged in the automated search for diversity since the meaning of diversity in this phrase was inconsistent with the meaning in which we were interested.


As shown in Figure 2, the term “pluralism” itself is infrequently used. It was most frequently used in the 2012 report—11 times. Yet, the average number of uses between 2001 and 2016 was just 1.6 (24 total). In most instances, pluralism referred to “legal pluralism.” References to inequality and diversity are, in contrast, much more common.

Figure 2: Total Frequency of Mention of Diversity, Inequality and Pluralism in WDRs (2001–16)



Considering usage over time, the trend of the past 15 years shows that there is no clear increase in attention to diversity, inequality and pluralism. Figure 3 illustrates that attention has varied year to year.

Figure 3: Frequency of Mention of Diversity, Inequality and Pluralism in WDRs by Year (2001–16)



This inconsistent attention to issues of diversity and overall lack of discussion of pluralism presents a possible opening for the Global Centre for Pluralism and other practitioners. One unique contribution, to which I return in the conclusion, could thus be elevating, and keeping, issues of diversity and pluralism on the global agenda.

The Measurement of Development

Another way to consider the international development community's degree of attention to social diversity and pluralism is to consider the ways in which development itself is measured by key development actors. As Joseph Stiglitz,

Amartya Sen and Jean-Paul Fitoussi put it in their Report by the Commission on Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2010, later published under the title *Mismeasuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn't Add Up*), “[t]he decisions they [those attempting to guide the economy and our societies] (and we as individual citizens) make depend on *what we measure*, how good our measurements are and how well our measures are understood.”⁸⁸ In short, no common measure of development includes pluralism, despite some acknowledgement of the inherent value of pluralism.

Sustainable Development Goals

Finally, another way to think about the attention and approaches to diversity and pluralism is to focus on the SDGs as an articulation of the priorities upon which key actors in the global arena and international development community has converged. World leaders adopted the SDGs in September 2015, following the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The SDGs include 17 goals, each of which is then broken down into many more specific targets.

In order to examine if and how the SDGs map to the Global Centre for Pluralism's goals, my RAs and I compared each of the factors that “drive” inclusion and exclusion in diverse societies and appearing in the Centre's Pluralism framework to the UN Sustainable Development Goals.⁸⁹ Each SDG was compared against each pluralism driver. For example, SDG Goal 10 “reduced inequalities,” and in particular target 10.2, appears in most of the sub-

categories or drivers provided by the Global Centre for Pluralism. The full mapping of the SDGs against the Global Centre for Pluralism framework appears in the Appendix.

Considering the goals with an eye to the development and pluralism continuum, many targets fit in with at least a minimalist perspective. Goal 10 stands out: “reduced inequalities.” Target 10.1 aims to sustain income growth that is higher than the national average for the bottom 40% of the population. Target 10.2 sets forth the aim to “empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status.” Target 10.3 specifically notes the likely need for asymmetric policies for different social groupings: “Ensure equal opportunity and reduce inequalities of outcome, including by eliminating discriminatory laws, policies and practices and promoting appropriate legislation, policies and action in this regard.” To the extent that “development for all” may require asymmetric treatment, a number of additional goals may sit in the minimalist perspective. This includes such things as target 6.1 “by 2030 achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water *for all*” or target 7.1 “by 2030, ensure *universal access* to affordable, reliable and modern energy services.”

Diverse groups are more directly addressed within other goals and specific groups are named in some places, again with a focus on inequality and the added specificity that these are the most marginalized and the underlying assumption that they may need special programming. These goals

also fall into the minimalist grouping. For instance, target 1.4 (of goal “no poverty”) focuses on “men and women, in particular the poor and vulnerable,” target 4.5 (on “quality education”) specifies the inclusion of “persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations,” target 8.5 (on “decent work and economic growth”) highlights “women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities” and target 13.6 (on “climate action”) notes “focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities.”

Some of the SDGs concentrate more directly on pluralism and diversity as a value, embracing a maximalist position. These include target 11.4 (of the goal “sustainable cities and communities”), to “strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage.” Target 4.7 on “quality education” includes education for “appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development.”

V. CONCLUSION: THE POSSIBLE ROLE AND VALUE-ADDED OF A PLURALISM PERSPECTIVE IN DEVELOPMENT

One way in which the Global Centre for Pluralism and development practitioners and scholars may play a role in advancing a pluralism perspective on

development is by supporting the broadening of the evidence base in regards to the impact of strategies that promote pluralism on development. The first section of this paper contrasted two positions: diversity as a hindrance to development, with social diversity as a boon to development. This section showed that there is much more empirical evidence of diversity as a hindrance to development, yet also evidence that context-specific programming overcomes this hindrance, and theoretical support of the idea that diversity can promote development. The second section showed that it is difficult to find examples of mainstream international actors who think promoting diversity is instrumentally important for development. Most are more minimalist in wanting to address social diversity to make sure no groups are left behind in development and to overcome possible harmful consequences of diversity for development. As such, one area of contribution for the Global Centre for Pluralism and others is to support rigorous field-based empirical research that examines the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of specific pluralism-based development interventions in specific contexts. One related effort is UNESCO's recent project on Culture for Development Indicators.⁹⁰ It will be important to the Global Centre for Pluralism's interest in the possible value-added of pluralism to assemble further rigorous evidence. If the evidence suggests that specific pluralistic approaches support development, this may also help towards the realization of the SDGs.

Second, the first section of the paper proposed that having people and their governments value diversity is a necessary, but insufficient precondition for reaping possible benefits of diversity. The Global

Centre for Pluralism and development practitioners can play a role in raising awareness of the value and importance of diversity. The third section of the paper showed that there is currently quite inconsistent attention to issues of diversity and overall lack of discussion of pluralism especially in the way the Global Centre for Pluralism defines it—respect for diversity. As the 2004 *Human Development Report* puts it, “[c]ultural liberty will not just happen, any more than health, education and gender equity just happen. Fostering it should be a core concern of governments, even where there are no explicit policies of persecution or discrimination.”⁹¹ This too presents a possible opening for the Global Centre for Pluralism and its partners. One unique contribution of the Centre could thus be helping to get, and then keep, issues of diversity and pluralism on the global agenda. The SDGs present a particularly salient opportunity.

Finally, the examination of existing measures of development also highlights oversights in these measures. To the extent that pluralism is a value of the international community, and that it is overlooked by existing measures of development, there is an opening for a pluralism index or assessment tool, spearheaded by the Global Centre for Pluralism and/or its partners, which could make an important contribution to global knowledge and practice.

NOTES

- ¹ Elisabeth King is Associate Professor of International Education and Politics at New York University. Sincere thanks for excellent research assistance to Emily Dunlop and Jill Armstrong, and for helpful advice to Beverly Boutlier, Matthew Burkard, Poorvi Chitalkar, Will Kymlicka and Cyrus Samii.
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- ⁵ Amartya Sen (1999), *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books), 3.
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APPENDIX: TAKING A PLURALISM LENS TO THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

	UN SDG	#	Targets
Global Centre for Pluralism: The Governance of Pluralism – Livelihoods and Wellbeing			
<p>Quality of Life</p> <p>Equality of outcomes for individuals and groups</p> <p>Equitable access to and benefit from resources</p>	No Poverty	1	1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance
	Zero Hunger	2	2.1 By 2030, end hunger and ensure access by all people, in particular the poor and people in vulnerable situations, including infants, to safe, nutritious and sufficient food all year round 2.2 By 2030, end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving, by 2025, the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under 5 years of age, and address the nutritional needs of adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women and older persons
	Good Health and Well-Being	3	3.7 By 2030, ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health-care services, including for family planning, information and education, and the integration of reproductive health into national strategies and programs 3.8 Achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, access to quality essential health-care services and access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all
	Quality Education	4	4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes 4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations 4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university 4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship
	Clean Water and Sanitation	6	6.1 By 2030, achieve universal and equitable access to safe and affordable drinking water for all
	Affordable and Clean Energy	7	7.1 By 2030, ensure universal access to affordable, reliable and modern energy services

	Decent Work and Economic Growth	8	8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services 8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value
	Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure	9	9.2 Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry's share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries
	Reduced Inequalities	10	10.2 Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions
	Sustainable Cities and Communities	11	11.1 By 2030, ensure access for all to adequate, safe and affordable housing and basic services and upgrade slums
	Responsible Consumption and Production	12	12.8 By 2030, ensure that people everywhere have the relevant information and awareness for sustainable development and lifestyles in harmony with nature
Global Centre for Pluralism: The Governance of Pluralism			
How governments act Defining and sustaining inclusive citizenship Institutional mechanisms Norms, policies, resources	Gender Equality	5	5.a Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws 5.c Adopt and strengthen sound policies and enforceable legislation for the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of all women and girls at all levels
	Clean Water and Sanitation	6	6.5 By 2030, implement integrated water resources management at all levels, including through transboundary cooperation as appropriate 6.b Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management
	Decent Work and Economic Growth	8	8.8 Protect labour rights and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including migrant workers, in particular women migrants, and those in precarious employment
	Reduced Inequalities	10	10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status

	Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	16	<p>16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all</p> <p>16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</p>
Global Centre for Pluralism: The Governance of Pluralism – Citizens, Civil Society and Identity			
How citizens act			
Inclusive citizenship practices	Gender Equality	5	<p>5.5 Ensure women’s full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life</p> <p>5.a Undertake reforms to give women equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to ownership and control over land and other forms of property, financial services, inheritance and natural resources, in accordance with national laws</p>
Expression of multiple identities (civic, ethnic, gender, religious)	Decent Work and Economic Growth	8	<p>8.3 Promote development-oriented policies that support productive activities, decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation, and encourage the formalization and growth of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, including through access to financial services</p> <p>8.5 By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value</p>
Arena for redefining inclusion	Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure	9	9.2 Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry’s share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries
	Reduced Inequalities	10	10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or other status
	Sustainable Cities and Communities	11	11.c By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities
	Life on Land	15	15.6 Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities

	Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	16	<p>16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels</p> <p>16.9 By 2030, provide legal identity for all, including birth registration</p> <p>16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</p> <p>16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime</p> <p>16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development</p>
Global Centre for Pluralism: Sites of Cultural Exchange – Education, Religion and Media			
<p>Transmission of norms</p> <p>Intergenerat-ional learning</p> <p>Intercultural Exchange</p> <p>News, the internet, social media, the arts</p>	Quality Education	4	<p>4.1 By 2030, ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes</p> <p>4.5 By 2030, eliminate gender disparities in education and ensure equal access to all levels of education and vocational training for the vulnerable, including persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and children in vulnerable situations</p> <p>4.3 By 2030, ensure equal access for all women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and tertiary education, including university</p> <p>4.4 By 2030, substantially increase the number of youth and adults who have relevant skills, including technical and vocational skills, for employment, decent jobs and entrepreneurship</p> <p>4.6 By 2030, ensure that all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy</p>
	Sustainable Cities and Communities	11	<p>11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage</p> <p>11.c By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities</p>
	Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	16	<p>16.10 Ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements</p>

Global Centre for Pluralism: Sites of Cultural Exchange – History and Memory			
The past in the present Impact of past grievances Inclusive remembering	Reduced Inequalities	10	10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status
	Sustainable Cities and Communities	11	11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage
	Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	11	16.1 Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere 16.3 Promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
Global Centre for Pluralism: Sites of Cultural Exchange – Places and Spaces			
Landscapes of cultural exchange Neighbour-hoods and cities Rural areas and communities Public-private connections; families, cyberspace work	Quality Education	4	4.7 By 2030, ensure that all learners acquire the knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture’s contribution to sustainable development
	Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure	9	9.2 Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and, by 2030, significantly raise industry’s share of employment and gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double its share in least developed countries 9.3 Increase the access of small-scale industrial and other enterprises, in particular in developing countries, to financial services, including affordable credit, and their integration into value chains and markets 9.c Significantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020
	Sustainable Cities and Communities	11	11.7 By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities 11.c Support least developed countries, including through financial and technical assistance, in building sustainable and resilient buildings utilizing local materials

Global Centre for Pluralism: Transnational and Regional Influences			
<p>Potential Impacts of External Actors</p> <p>Neighbour-hood influences</p> <p>Historic border making</p> <p>Trans-national identities</p> <p>Virtual communities</p> <p>International norms, institutions and actors</p>	<p>Zero Hunger</p>	<p>2</p>	<p>2.a Increase investment, including through enhanced international cooperation, in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology development and plant and livestock gene banks in order to enhance agricultural productive capacity in developing countries, in particular least developed countries</p> <p>2.b Correct and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round</p>
	<p>Good Health and Well-Being</p>	<p>3</p>	<p>3.a Strengthen the implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in all countries, as appropriate</p> <p>3.c Substantially increase health financing and the recruitment, development, training and retention of the health workforce in developing countries, especially in least developed countries and small island developing States</p>
	<p>Quality Education</p>	<p>4</p>	<p>4.b By 2020, substantially expand globally the number of scholarships available to developing countries, in particular least developed countries, small island developing States and African countries, for enrolment in higher education, including vocational training and information and communications technology, technical, engineering and scientific programs, in developed countries and other developing countries</p> <p>4.c By 2030, substantially increase the supply of qualified teachers, including through international cooperation for teacher training in developing countries, especially least developed countries and small island developing States</p>
	<p>Clean Water and Sanitation</p>	<p>6</p>	<p>6.a By 2030, expand international cooperation and capacity-building support to developing countries in water- and sanitation-related activities and programs, including water harvesting, desalination, water efficiency, wastewater treatment, recycling and reuse technologies</p> <p>6.b Support and strengthen the participation of local communities in improving water and sanitation management</p>
	<p>Affordable and Clean Energy</p>	<p>7</p>	<p>7.a By 2030, enhance international cooperation to facilitate access to clean energy research and technology, including renewable energy, energy efficiency and advanced and cleaner fossil-fuel technology, and promote investment in energy infrastructure and clean energy technology</p>
	<p>Reduced Inequalities</p>	<p>10</p>	<p>10.2 By 2030, empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, or economic or other status</p> <p>10.6 Ensure enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions</p>

	Sustainable Cities and Communities	11	<p>11.a Support positive economic, social and environmental links between urban, peri-urban and rural areas by strengthening national and regional development planning</p> <p>11.4 Strengthen efforts to protect and safeguard the world’s cultural and natural heritage</p> <p>11.c By 2030, provide universal access to safe, inclusive and accessible, green and public spaces, in particular for women and children, older persons and persons with disabilities</p>
	Climate Action	13	<p>13.b Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate change-related planning and management in least developed countries and small island developing States, including focusing on women, youth and local and marginalized communities</p>
	Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions	16	<p>16.8 Broaden and strengthen the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance</p> <p>16.a Strengthen relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime</p> <p>16.b Promote and enforce non-discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development</p>
	Partnerships for the Goals	17	<p>17.6 Enhance North-South, South-South and triangular regional and international cooperation on and access to science, technology and innovation and enhance knowledge sharing on mutually agreed terms, including through improved coordination among existing mechanisms, in particular at the United Nations level, and through a global technology facilitation mechanism</p> <p>17.9 Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South and triangular cooperation</p> <p>17.10 Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the World Trade Organization, including through the conclusion of negotiations under its Doha Development Agenda</p> <p>17.15 Respect each country’s policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development</p> <p>17.17 By 2020, enhance capacity-building support to developing countries, including for least developed countries and small island developing States, to increase significantly the availability of high-quality, timely and reliable data disaggregated by income, gender, age, race, ethnicity, migratory status, disability, geographic location and other characteristics relevant in national contexts</p>

AUTHOR

Elisabeth King is an Associate Professor of International Education at the Steinhardt School of Culture, Education, and Human Development at New York University. Her recent research interests include education, youth programs, and community-driven development interventions in the global South.

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